`allowedSchemes` includes `data`, so `data:text/html` links survive sanitization (stored/preview XSS)

[godownio]

Summary

Artalk’s frontend HTML sanitizer allowlists the data: URL scheme. Comment HTML such as <a href="data:text/html;base64,…"> therefore survives sanitization and is injected via innerHTML. Clicking the link executes arbitrary JavaScript in a data: browsing context.

This is present in v2.9.1 (insane) and still present in v2.10.0 after the sanitizer was switched to DOMPurify. v2.10.0’s release notes say the previous URL-scheme allowlist was intentionally retained, so upgrading to 2.10.0 does not close this issue.

Source (v2.9.1 ui/artalk/src/lib/sanitizer.ts):

allowedSchemes: [
  'http',
  'https',
  'mailto',
  'data', // for support base64 encoded image (安全性有待考虑)
],

v2.10.0 still has:

const allowedSchemes = new Set(['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'data'])
// …
ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS: ['a'],

The comment already notes that allowing data is a security concern. The intended use appears to be base64 images, but the allowlist does not restrict MIME type, so data:text/html on <a href> is accepted.

<script> tags are stripped (allowlist does not include script). The bypass is the allowed data: scheme on a[href].

Affected versions

• Confirmed in source: v2.9.1 (ui/artalk/src/lib/sanitizer.ts + insane@2.6.2)
• Confirmed in source: v2.10.0 (DOMPurify, same data scheme + ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS: ['a'])
• v2.10.0 tests still expect <a href="data:text/plain,hello"> to be kept

Reproduction (local, sanitizer only)

Using the v2.9.1 insane options copied from sanitizer.ts:

import insane from 'insane'

const insaneOptions = {
  allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'data'],
  allowedTags: ['a', 'p', 'img' /* …same as Artalk… */],
  allowedAttributes: {
    a: ['href', 'name', 'target', 'aria-label', 'rel'],
    img: ['src', 'alt', 'title'],
  },
}

const payload =
  '<p><a href="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==" target="_blank">click</a></p>'

console.log(insane(payload, insaneOptions))
// → <p><a href="data:text/html;base64,…" target="_blank">click</a></p>
// data: survives

console.log(insane(payload, { ...insaneOptions, allowedSchemes: ['http', 'https', 'mailto'] }))
// → <p><a target="_blank">click</a></p>
// href stripped

Base64 payload decodes to <script>alert(1)</script>.

In the live UI: put that HTML in the comment editor and open Preview. Artalk runs marked then sanitize() / getContentMarked() into innerHTML. A data:text/html link appears; clicking it (often target="_blank") executes the script.

Impact

• Unauthenticated comment content (or preview of unsaved content) can carry a data:text/html link.
• Clicking the link runs attacker JavaScript. That document’s origin is "null" (data: URLs), so this is not classic same-origin cookie theft from the host site (document.cookie on data: pages is blocked).
• Practical impact: phishing / fake “support” pages, arbitrary JS in the data: document, social-engineering of moderators who click links while reviewing comments.
• <img src="https://…"> in comments can also fire automatically when HTML is rendered (OOB ping), which is a separate issue from JS execution.

Suggested fix

1. Remove 'data' from allowedSchemes, or only allow data: on <img src> with an image MIME (">x</a>') must not keep that href.
5. Server-side: do not trust client HTML; sanitize content the same way so pending/moderator views cannot render raw data:text/html.

v2.10.0 replacing insane with DOMPurify is a good hardening step for ReDoS / unmaintained parser issues; it does not by itself fix this allowlist bug.