Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Please do not open a public issue for anything in the categories below.

This is a single-maintainer hobby project. Expect an acknowledgement within a week and a fix when one is possible; there is no paid support and no bounty.

TennoScope has no server, no account, and no network service, so the usual web threat model does not apply. What matters instead:

• Leaking session credentials. The account identifier and nonce read from game memory are live session credentials. Any path that writes them to disk, to a log, into the database, into a crash dump, or over the network is a vulnerability, not a bug.
• Leaking player data. Anything that publishes another player's handle or account identifier — including in a debug capture, a test fixture, or a bundled screenshot.
• Writing to game memory. Every memory path in this project is read-only by design. A write, or anything that could be turned into one, is a vulnerability.
• Escalation. Anything that requires or encourages running as root, a setuid binary, or broad capabilities. The documented answer to a ptrace_scope failure is a user decision, never a privilege grab by the application.
• Command injection through tesseract, the one external tool the reward reader still shells out to. On Windows that is the copy bundled with the installer; a path that would run a different one is in scope.
• Catalog integrity. The item catalog is fetched over the network and cached. A path that accepts an unvalidated or partial generation is in scope.

• Requiring kernel.yama.ptrace_scope=0 on some systems. That is documented, and the trade-off is the user's to make.
• The account-policy risk of reading game memory at all. That is the disclosed premise of the project, not a defect — see the risk section in the README.
• Anything in scripts/. Those are unsupported research instruments, not shipped code.

The latest release only. This project has not reached 1.0; older versions receive nothing.