Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Please report privately instead — this project is small and maintained by one person, so email is the fastest path:
- Email:
bridge-security@users.noreply.github.com(maintainer's GitHub noreply address — the exact mailbox is resolved at the maintainer's side; if this address bounces, open a private issue via the GitHub security advisory flow: repo → Security → Report a vulnerability)
You should receive an acknowledgment within 3 business days. If you do not hear back, escalate via a private issue on the repository (GitHub's confidential reporting).
- Affected version / commit SHA
- Steps to reproduce (minimal)
- Impact description
- Suggested fix (optional)
- Loopback-only by default — the bridge and sidecar bind
127.0.0.1; non-loopback binding is refused unless--require-tokenis set and a dedicated sidecar token is provided (the bridge admin token is never reusable for remote access). - Zero-dependency core —
codex_a2a_bridge.py/hermes_mcp_server.pyimport stdlib only, reducing the supply-chain surface. - Secrets scan in CI — every push is scanned for credential patterns, local paths and business-specific words (tracked files + git history).
- Token handling — runtime tokens (
bridge.token,inbound.token) are gitignored, generated on first run, and never logged.
- AgentCard signing is fail-open: a
--sign-keyfailure logs and continues serving an unsigned AgentCard (discovery endpoints are anonymous per the A2A spec). If you require strict verification, gate clients accordingly. /healthand AgentCard stay anonymous in remote mode — they are discovery endpoints; they expose no task data.
Only the latest main is actively maintained. There are no LTS releases.