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129 changes: 129 additions & 0 deletions docs/security/threat-model.md
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# Threat model — IgniteUI.Blazor.GridLite

| | |
|---|---|
| **Status** | Draft — awaiting maintainer review |
| **Package in scope** | `IgniteUI.Blazor.GridLite` (net8.0 / net9.0 / net10.0) |
| **Repository** | https://github.com/IgniteUI/IgniteUI.Blazor.GridLite |
| **Reviewed commit** | <!-- TODO(maintainer): SHA at time of sign-off --> |
| **Document owner** | <!-- TODO(maintainer): name --> |
| **Last updated** | 2026-08-11 |
| **Method** | STRIDE per trust boundary |

## 1. Why this document exists

This document records the package's security boundaries, assumptions, and controls. It is a **living document** and must be updated whenever the JS interop surface, serialization boundary, bundled JavaScript, or release process changes.

Individual threat findings, their severities, and their remediation status are **not published**. They are tracked privately by the maintainers and are not included in this document.

It is not a penetration test, not an audit, and not an attestation of security.

## 2. Scope

**In scope**

- The `IgniteUI.Blazor.GridLite` NuGet package: managed code under `src/IgniteUI.Blazor.GridLite/`.
- The static web asset it ships: `wwwroot/js/blazor-igc-grid-lite.js` (Vite bundle of `igc-grid-lite-entry.js` and the `igniteui-grid-lite` npm package).
- The build and release pipeline that produces and signs the package.

**Out of scope**

- The consuming application (its authentication, authorization, CSP, data access).
- Internal implementation of the upstream `igniteui-grid-lite` npm package, except for its behavior at the rendering boundary.
- The ASP.NET Core Blazor framework itself. Framework-level behavior is treated as an assumption (§5).
- The demo application under `demo/`.

## 3. Architecture and trust boundaries

```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph SRV["Server circuit / WASM runtime — trusted"]
C["IgbGridLite&lt;TItem&gt;"]
H["JSHandler&lt;TItem&gt;<br/>[JSInvokable] callbacks"]
A["Consuming app<br/>Sorting / Filtering handlers"]
end
subgraph BR["Browser — untrusted"]
M["blazor-igc-grid-lite.js<br/>window.blazor_igc_grid_lite"]
W["igc-grid-lite custom element<br/>(shadow DOM)"]
end
C -- "TB1: JSON.Serialize(Data, options)" --> M
M -- "TB2: invokeMethodAsync(e.detail)" --> H
H --> A
M --> W
W -- "user sorts / filters" --> M
```

The two package-specific trust boundaries are:

- **TB1 — server → client.** Everything crossing it is visible to the end user, forever.
- **TB2 — client → server.** In Blazor Server, callback data originates in the browser and must be treated as untrusted input. In Blazor WebAssembly, it remains client-controlled but does not cross into a server circuit.

## 4. Assets and security objectives

| Asset | Objective |
|---|---|
| Consumer data bound to `Data` (`IEnumerable<TItem>`) | Confidentiality — only intended serializable properties reach the browser |
| The Blazor circuit (server-side rendering) | Availability — a client cannot exhaust CPU/memory |
| The consuming app's browser origin | Integrity — the component never introduces script execution |
| The published NuGet package | Integrity — signed, reproducible, no unintended content |

## 5. Assumptions and consumer responsibilities

The model is only valid if these assumptions hold. Consumer-facing responsibilities must be documented where they affect secure use of the package.

| # | Assumption |
|---|---|
| A1 | The consuming app enforces authentication/authorization; the grid performs none. |
| A2 | The consuming app enforces a Content Security Policy appropriate to its render mode. |
| A3 | The consuming app prevents untrusted script execution. The component must avoid introducing script execution and avoid unnecessarily widening access available to other scripts running in the same origin. |
| A4 | Data bound to `Data` has already passed the app's own authorization filter. |
| A5 | `IgbGridLiteOptions.JavascriptPath` is a compile-time constant controlled by the app, never derived from user input or untrusted configuration. |

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A5 describes JavascriptPath as app-controlled, but the current public API doesn't expose it: IgbGridLiteOptions and Options are internal, and [Parameter] is commented out. A Razor Options=... assignment is captured as an HTML attribute rather than configuring this path. Could A5 instead state that the path is currently internal/not consumer-settable, and note that validation would be needed if it's exposed later?

| A6 | Blazor Server hosts retain appropriate SignalR message-size and circuit resource limits. Applications that increase those limits must reassess the availability impact of client-driven interop callbacks. |

## 6. Threat analysis

STRIDE analysis is performed against each trust boundary described in §3, covering:

- **TB2 — client → server**: the JS interop callback surface.
- **TB1 — server → client**: the serialization and rendering surface.
- **Supply chain, build and release**: dependency bundling and the publish pipeline.

Severity is assessed as residual severity **given** assumptions A1–A6.

The resulting findings, severities, remediation status, and any accepted risks are maintained in a private maintainer-only record and are deliberately omitted here. Suspected vulnerabilities should be reported through [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/guidance-on-reporting-and-writing-information-about-vulnerabilities/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability) on this repository rather than in a public issue.

## 7. Existing controls

Controls already in place, verified in the repository files, evaluated build properties, and repository-level GitHub settings:

- **Code scanning** — GitHub CodeQL default setup is configured with the extended query suite for Actions, C#, and JavaScript/TypeScript; analyses run for the default branch and pull requests.
- **Repository protection** — secret scanning, push protection, Dependabot security updates, vulnerability alerts, and Private Vulnerability Reporting are enabled.
- **Release integrity** — Authenticode signing of all DLLs with a post-sign verification gate; NuGet package signing followed by `dotnet nuget verify`.
- **Credential hygiene** — Azure OIDC federation and NuGet Trusted Publishing use short-lived credentials rather than stored cloud or NuGet publishing secrets.
- **Workflow permissions** — job-scoped `permissions: { id-token: write, contents: read }`.
- **Reproducible dependency install** — `npm ci` against a committed `package-lock.json`.
- **Dependency updates** — Dependabot is configured for weekly GitHub Actions version updates, and repository-level Dependabot security updates are enabled.
- **Managed-code determinism** — the evaluated SDK property `Deterministic` is `true`, and portable PDBs are generated.
- **No unsafe primitives** — no `eval`, `new Function`, `MarkupString`, `AddMarkupContent`, or `AllowUnsafeBlocks` in first-party code.

## 8. Review and sign-off log

| Version | Commit | Reviewers | Date | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| <!-- TODO --> | | | | |

Release gate: **no open finding of severity High or above may ship.** Findings themselves are tracked privately (§6).

## 9. References

- [Threat mitigation guidance for ASP.NET Core Blazor interactive server-side rendering](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/core/blazor/security/interactive-server-side-rendering)
- [Call .NET methods from JavaScript functions in ASP.NET Core Blazor](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/core/blazor/javascript-interoperability/call-dotnet-from-javascript)
- [Call JavaScript functions from .NET methods in ASP.NET Core Blazor](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/core/blazor/javascript-interoperability/call-javascript-from-dotnet)
- [Enforce a Content Security Policy for ASP.NET Core Blazor](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/aspnet/core/blazor/security/content-security-policy)
- [Microsoft SDL — Threat Modeling](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl/threatmodeling)
- [OWASP Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- [GitHub — About code scanning with CodeQL](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/introduction-to-code-scanning/about-code-scanning-with-codeql)
- [GitHub — Configuring default setup for code scanning](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/code-scanning/enabling-code-scanning/configuring-default-setup-for-code-scanning)
- [GitHub — Privately reporting a security vulnerability](https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/security-advisories/working-with-repository-security-advisories/privately-reporting-a-security-vulnerability)
- [GitHub — Security hardening for GitHub Actions](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions)
- [NuGet Trusted Publishing](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/nuget/nuget-org/trusted-publishing)