@@ -1116,6 +1116,7 @@ fn provider_environment_result(
         .collect::<Result<HashMap<_, _>>>()?;
     Ok(ProviderEnvironmentResult {
         environment: inner.environment,
+        files: inner.files,
         provider_env_revision: inner.provider_env_revision,
         provider_attachment_epoch: inner.provider_attachment_epoch,
         policy_hash: inner.policy_hash,
@@ -1380,6 +1381,7 @@ mod settings_poll_tests {
 /// Credential material and the authority snapshot that produced its bindings.
 pub struct ProviderEnvironmentResult {
     pub environment: HashMap<String, String>,
+    pub files: HashMap<String, String>,
     pub provider_env_revision: u64,
     /// Attachment identity captured with the delivered credential records.
     pub provider_attachment_epoch: String,
 
@@ -36,11 +36,14 @@ pub struct ChildEnvironmentSnapshot {
     pub revision: u64,
     /// Prepared environment used by future workload processes.
     pub environment: HashMap<String, String>,
+    /// Complete desired set of non-secret files for this installation.
+    pub files: HashMap<String, String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
 struct ProviderCredentialStateInner {
     current: Arc<ProviderCredentialSnapshot>,
+    files: HashMap<String, String>,
     generations: VecDeque<Arc<SecretResolver>>,
     current_resolver: Option<Arc<SecretResolver>>,
     combined_resolver: Option<Arc<SecretResolver>>,
@@ -117,6 +120,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
         Self {
             inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(ProviderCredentialStateInner {
                 current: snapshot.clone(),
+                files: HashMap::new(),
                 generations,
                 current_resolver,
                 combined_resolver,
@@ -172,6 +176,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
         Ok(Self {
             inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(ProviderCredentialStateInner {
                 current: snapshot.clone(),
+                files: HashMap::new(),
                 generations,
                 current_resolver,
                 combined_resolver,
@@ -205,6 +210,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
         Self {
             inner: Arc::new(RwLock::new(ProviderCredentialStateInner {
                 current: snapshot.clone(),
+                files: HashMap::new(),
                 generations: VecDeque::new(),
                 current_resolver: None,
                 combined_resolver: None,
@@ -410,22 +416,19 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
         inner.current = Arc::new(env);
     }
 
-    /// Return `child_env` with GCP static config vars resolved to real values.
+    /// Return `child_env` with explicitly non-secret config vars resolved.
     ///
-    /// The credential pipeline placeholderizes ALL env values, but GCP SDKs
-    /// and coding agents read certain vars (project ID, region, metadata host)
-    /// at process startup before any HTTP request flows through the proxy.
-    /// This method overrides those vars with resolved real values while
-    /// keeping secret credentials (like `GCP_ACCESS_TOKEN`) as placeholders.
+    /// The credential pipeline placeholderizes all env values. Workloads need
+    /// non-secret configuration, including provider file paths, at process
+    /// startup before any HTTP request flows through the proxy. Credential
+    /// values remain placeholders.
     ///
     /// Three layers of env var injection:
     /// 1. **Synthetic vars** (`GCE_METADATA_IP`, `METADATA_SERVER_DETECTION`)
     ///    — sandbox-internal config not from user
     ///    input, inserted directly here with real values.
-    /// 2. **`google_cloud::STATIC_CONFIG_KEYS`** — user-provided non-secret config
-    ///    (project ID, region, SA email) that was placeholderized by
-    ///    `ProviderPlugin::inject_env` → `SecretResolver`; un-placeholderized
-    ///    here so SDKs can read them at startup.
+    /// 2. **Classified non-secret keys** — user-provided config and provider
+    ///    file paths un-placeholderized so workloads can read them at startup.
     /// 3. Everything else stays as placeholders for proxy-time resolution.
     pub fn child_env_with_gcp_resolved(&self) -> HashMap<String, String> {
         let inner = self
@@ -463,9 +466,18 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
             installation_id: inner.current.installation_id.clone(),
             revision,
             environment,
+            files: inner.files.clone(),
         })
     }
 
+    /// Attach the complete file set to a prepared provider snapshot.
+    pub fn set_managed_files(&self, files: HashMap<String, String>) {
+        self.inner
+            .write()
+            .expect("provider credential state poisoned")
+            .files = files;
+    }
+
     fn resolve_child_env_snapshot(
         inner: &ProviderCredentialStateInner,
     ) -> (u64, HashMap<String, String>) {
@@ -477,11 +489,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
             && inner
                 .non_secret_environment_keys
                 .contains("GCE_METADATA_HOST");
-        let has_gcp_config = google_cloud::STATIC_CONFIG_KEYS
-            .iter()
-            .any(|key| env.contains_key(*key) && inner.non_secret_environment_keys.contains(*key));
-
-        if !has_gcp_metadata && !has_gcp_config {
+        if !has_gcp_metadata && inner.non_secret_environment_keys.is_empty() {
             return (inner.current.revision, env);
         }
 
@@ -506,16 +514,15 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
             );
         }
 
-        // Un-placeholderize non-secret config vars so SDKs can read them
-        // at process startup before any HTTP flows through the proxy.
+        // Only explicitly classified non-secret values may be unwrapped.
         if let Some(ref resolver) = inner.combined_resolver {
-            for key in google_cloud::STATIC_CONFIG_KEYS
-                .iter()
-                .filter(|key| inner.non_secret_environment_keys.contains(**key))
-            {
+            for key in &inner.non_secret_environment_keys {
+                if !env.contains_key(key) || (has_gcp_metadata && key == "GCE_METADATA_HOST") {
+                    continue;
+                }
                 let placeholder = crate::secrets::placeholder_for_env_key(key);
                 if let Some(value) = resolver.resolve_placeholder(&placeholder) {
-                    env.insert(key.to_string(), value.to_string());
+                    env.insert(key.clone(), value.to_string());
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -738,7 +745,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
     pub fn install_prepared(&self, prepared: &Self) -> usize {
         // Release the candidate lock before taking the live lock, including
         // when a caller passes another handle to the same state.
-        let (snapshot, generations, current_resolver, bindings, non_secret_keys) = {
+        let (snapshot, generations, current_resolver, bindings, non_secret_keys, files) = {
             let candidate = prepared
                 .inner
                 .read()
@@ -749,6 +756,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
                 candidate.current_resolver.clone(),
                 candidate.static_credential_bindings.clone(),
                 candidate.non_secret_environment_keys.clone(),
+                candidate.files.clone(),
             )
         };
         let mut inner = self
@@ -781,6 +789,7 @@ impl ProviderCredentialState {
         );
         inner.static_credential_bindings = bindings;
         inner.non_secret_environment_keys = non_secret_keys;
+        inner.files = files;
         inner.body_inventory_available = true;
         inner
             .known_body_keys
@@ -2138,6 +2147,33 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!env.contains_key("CLAUDE_CODE_USE_VERTEX"));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn child_env_resolves_provider_file_path_but_keeps_credentials_placeholderized() {
+        let path = "/run/openshell/providers/acme/client.toml";
+        let state = ProviderCredentialState::from_bound_environment(
+            1,
+            HashMap::from([
+                ("ACME_CONFIG_FILE".to_string(), path.to_string()),
+                ("ACME_TOKEN".to_string(), "secret-token".to_string()),
+            ]),
+            HashMap::new(),
+            HashMap::new(),
+            HashMap::from([(
+                "ACME_TOKEN".to_string(),
+                binding("api.acme.example", 443, "/**"),
+            )]),
+            vec!["ACME_CONFIG_FILE".to_string()],
+        )
+        .expect("classified provider environment");
+
+        let env = state.child_env_with_gcp_resolved();
+        assert_eq!(env.get("ACME_CONFIG_FILE").map(String::as_str), Some(path));
+        assert_eq!(
+            env.get("ACME_TOKEN").map(String::as_str),
+            Some("openshell:resolve:env:v1_ACME_TOKEN")
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn child_env_with_gcp_resolved_overrides_gcp_static_vars() {
         let state = ProviderCredentialState::from_bound_environment(
 
@@ -432,7 +432,8 @@ pub fn install_listener(syscalls: &[i64]) -> io::Result<NotificationListener> {
 /// reconfigure an INET endpoint. Connected `send()`/null-destination
 /// `sendto()` retains the audited cBPF fast path.
 pub fn install_workload_listener() -> io::Result<NotificationListener> {
-    install_listener(&[
+    #[allow(unused_mut)] // SYS_open is unavailable on some architectures.
+    let mut syscalls = vec![
         libc::SYS_socket,
         libc::SYS_connect,
         libc::SYS_bind,
@@ -447,7 +448,12 @@ pub fn install_workload_listener() -> io::Result<NotificationListener> {
         libc::SYS_kill,
         libc::SYS_tkill,
         libc::SYS_rt_sigqueueinfo,
-    ])
+        libc::SYS_openat,
+        libc::SYS_openat2,
+    ];
+    #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")]
+    syscalls.push(libc::SYS_open);
+    install_listener(&syscalls)
 }
 
 /// Run a no-capability conformance probe.
 
@@ -137,7 +137,27 @@ mod tests {
             })
             .expect("launcher result")
             .expect("spawn child");
-        let notification = listener.receive().expect("receive child socket");
+        let notification = loop {
+            let notification = listener.receive().expect("receive child syscall");
+            let syscall = i64::from(notification.syscall);
+            if syscall == libc::SYS_socket {
+                break notification;
+            }
+            if syscall == libc::SYS_openat || syscall == libc::SYS_openat2 {
+                listener
+                    .respond_continue(notification.id)
+                    .expect("continue ordinary file open");
+                continue;
+            }
+            #[cfg(target_arch = "x86_64")]
+            if syscall == libc::SYS_open {
+                listener
+                    .respond_continue(notification.id)
+                    .expect("continue ordinary file open");
+                continue;
+            }
+            panic!("unexpected child syscall: {syscall}");
+        };
         assert_eq!(i64::from(notification.syscall), libc::SYS_socket);
         assert!(
             std::path::Path::new(&format!("/proc/{}/task/{}", child.id(), notification.tid))
 
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ mod tests {
 
     fn profile() -> ProviderTypeProfile {
         ProviderTypeProfile {
+            files: Vec::new(),
             id: "custom".to_string(),
             resource_version: 0,
             annotations: std::collections::HashMap::new(),