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scripts: πŸ›‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix command injection in feeds - #277

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manupawickramasinghe merged 4 commits into
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jules-15540037090694878068-d0b4069b
Sep 17, 2026
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manupawickramasinghe merged 4 commits into
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jules-15540037090694878068-d0b4069b

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🚨 Severity: HIGH
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Command injection exists in scripts/feeds because external feed data (like package paths and names) are interpolated into single-string system() calls.
🎯 Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the build environment when processing a malicious feed.
πŸ”§ Fix: Replaced vulnerable single-string system() calls with array-based system(@args) to bypass the shell.
βœ… Verification: Ran perl -c scripts/feeds to verify syntax.


PR created automatically by Jules for task 15540037090694878068 started by @manupawickramasinghe

🚨 Severity: HIGH
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Command injection exists in `scripts/feeds` because external feed data (like package paths and names) are interpolated into single-string `system()` calls.
🎯 Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the build environment when processing a malicious feed.
πŸ”§ Fix: Replaced vulnerable single-string `system()` calls with array-based `system(@Args)` to bypass the shell.
βœ… Verification: Ran `perl -c scripts/feeds` to verify syntax.

Signed-off-by: $(git config user.name) <$(git config user.email)>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
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google-labs-jules Bot and others added 3 commits September 14, 2026 02:11
🚨 Severity: HIGH
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Command injection exists in `scripts/feeds` because external feed data (like package paths and names) are interpolated into single-string `system()` calls.
🎯 Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the build environment when processing a malicious feed.
πŸ”§ Fix: Replaced vulnerable single-string `system()` calls with array-based `system(@Args)` to bypass the shell.
βœ… Verification: Ran `perl -c scripts/feeds` to verify syntax.

Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: HIGH
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Command injection exists in `scripts/feeds` because external feed data (like package paths and names) are interpolated into single-string `system()` calls.
🎯 Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the build environment when processing a malicious feed.
πŸ”§ Fix: Replaced vulnerable single-string `system()` calls with array-based `system(@Args)` to bypass the shell.
βœ… Verification: Ran `perl -c scripts/feeds` to verify syntax.

Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: HIGH
πŸ’‘ Vulnerability: Command injection exists in `scripts/feeds` because external feed data (like package paths and names) are interpolated into single-string `system()` calls.
🎯 Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the build environment when processing a malicious feed.
πŸ”§ Fix: Replaced vulnerable single-string `system()` calls with array-based `system(@Args)` to bypass the shell.
βœ… Verification: Ran `perl -c scripts/feeds` to verify syntax.

Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
@manupawickramasinghe
manupawickramasinghe merged commit e21542f into main Sep 17, 2026
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@manupawickramasinghe
manupawickramasinghe deleted the jules-15540037090694878068-d0b4069b branch September 17, 2026 18:54
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