Summary
The refresh-token cookie was set with httpOnly: true but missing both the secure flag and the sameSite attribute. Over plain HTTP the cookie could be intercepted on the network; without sameSite, browsers attached it to cross-site POSTs, enabling CSRF against the token-refresh endpoint.
Details
In packages/nocodb/src/services/users/helpers.ts, setTokenCookie produced the cookie with only httpOnly, an expires date, and an optional domain from NC_BASE_HOST_NAME — no secure, no sameSite. The refresh endpoint POST /api/v2/auth/token/refresh (auth.controller.ts) read the cookie unconditionally and returned a new JWT, with no CSRF token.
The fix sets httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax', and conditional secure: req.ncSiteUrl.startsWith('https') so the flag is active under HTTPS while still functional on plain-HTTP localhost development.
This is distinct from GHSA-x4vh-j75g-268g (refresh-token lifecycle on password reset) — different root cause, different attack vector.
Impact
- Cookie interception on plain HTTP networks (no
secure).
- Cross-site refresh: malicious cross-origin pages could trigger token refresh and, combined with any same-origin XSS or open-redirect on the NocoDB domain, capture the new JWT.
- Refresh tokens have multi-day expiry (
NC_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXP_IN_DAYS), so the exposure window is long.
Credit
This issue was reported by @ik0z.
References
ik0z Reporter
Summary
The refresh-token cookie was set with
httpOnly: truebut missing both thesecureflag and thesameSiteattribute. Over plain HTTP the cookie could be intercepted on the network; withoutsameSite, browsers attached it to cross-site POSTs, enabling CSRF against the token-refresh endpoint.Details
In
packages/nocodb/src/services/users/helpers.ts,setTokenCookieproduced the cookie with onlyhttpOnly, anexpiresdate, and an optionaldomainfromNC_BASE_HOST_NAME— nosecure, nosameSite. The refresh endpointPOST /api/v2/auth/token/refresh(auth.controller.ts) read the cookie unconditionally and returned a new JWT, with no CSRF token.The fix sets
httpOnly: true,sameSite: 'lax', and conditionalsecure: req.ncSiteUrl.startsWith('https')so the flag is active under HTTPS while still functional on plain-HTTP localhost development.This is distinct from GHSA-x4vh-j75g-268g (refresh-token lifecycle on password reset) — different root cause, different attack vector.
Impact
secure).NC_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXP_IN_DAYS), so the exposure window is long.Credit
This issue was reported by @ik0z.
References