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Security: arkadianet/erg-vanity-gpu

Security

docs/security.md

Security

Author: arkadianet

Early development. Implementations are not audited. Verify any funded mnemonic in the official Ergo wallet (or other trusted software) before use.

Secrets

A match prints a 24-word BIP39 mnemonic and 32-byte entropy. Either is enough to spend. Treat stdout, terminal scrollback, and logs as a wallet dump.

Debug on VanityResult and GeneratedAddress prints <redacted> for mnemonic, entropy, and private key. The CLI still prints the real mnemonic on a hit — that is intentional.

Keys stay in memory. They are not written to disk by this tool. Memory (CPU and GPU) is not explicitly zeroed after use.

Entropy

Search salt comes from the platform CSPRNG (rand::thread_rng() / OsRng). GPU work items then derive per-item entropy with Blake2b(salt ‖ counter ‖ work_item_id).

Verification

  • CPU primitives are tested against sha2, hmac, pbkdf2, blake2, bs58, k256, and ergo-lib 0.28.0.
  • Every hit shown to the user is re-derived with ergo-lib before it is printed.

That does not replace an independent wallet check for funds.

unsafe

Leaf crates (core, crypto, bip, address, cpu) forbid unsafe. Remaining unsafe is OpenCL FFI via the ocl crate (kernel enqueue and buffer element types).

There aren't any published security advisories