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35 | 35 | <section class="findings-panel" aria-labelledby="findings-title"> |
36 | 36 | <div class="section-kicker"> |
37 | 37 | <p class="eyebrow">Key findings</p> |
38 | | - <h2 id="findings-title">Europe grew. Public equity gains concentrated in the US.</h2> |
| 38 | + <h2 id="findings-title">Europe kept growing, but listed-equity gains and index weight shifted toward the US.</h2> |
39 | 39 | </div> |
40 | 40 | <div class="finding-grid"> |
41 | 41 | <article class="finding-card"> |
@@ -111,15 +111,15 @@ <h2>The benchmark is not arbitrary.</h2> |
111 | 111 | <p class="eyebrow">Act 3 · Divergence hypothesis</p> |
112 | 112 | <h2>The gap opens when we change the measure.</h2> |
113 | 113 | <p> |
114 | | - This leads us to the hypothesis that it isn't that Europe |
115 | | - stopped producing output, it is that output growth diverged from |
116 | | - broader market indicators. We apply a break-fit test to find |
117 | | - divergence points in various metrics, and find that candidate |
118 | | - break years cluster around the 2008 crisis window. The |
119 | | - normalization view lets you explore these critical years and |
120 | | - view the apparent divergence - much wider for ETF data and |
121 | | - market cap, but much narrower for GDP, and especially after |
122 | | - adjusting for PPP. |
| 114 | + This leads to a narrower hypothesis: Europe did not stop |
| 115 | + producing output, but market-linked indicators pulled away |
| 116 | + after the crisis. To check that, we fit the log US/Europe gap |
| 117 | + with the same piecewise trend at each candidate break year from |
| 118 | + 2005 to 2015 and rank those fits by BIC. The best-ranked years |
| 119 | + cluster around the 2008 crisis window. The normalization view |
| 120 | + then lets you stress-test the split across base years and |
| 121 | + lenses: it is widest for ETF and market-cap proxies, narrower |
| 122 | + for GDP, and narrower still after PPP adjustment. |
123 | 123 | </p> |
124 | 124 | <div class="story-stat-row"> |
125 | 125 | <span><strong>2.51x</strong> US ETF</span> |
@@ -181,45 +181,19 @@ <h2>The sectors driving divergence.</h2> |
181 | 181 |
|
182 | 182 | <article class="story-step story-step--explore" data-story-preset="wrap-up"> |
183 | 183 | <p class="eyebrow">Conclusion · What falling behind means</p> |
184 | | - <h2>Europe is not collapsing. Listed-market power moved elsewhere.</h2> |
| 184 | + <h2>Europe kept growing. Market-linked gains pulled away.</h2> |
185 | 185 | <p> |
186 | 186 | The final scatter keeps the comparison narrow: selected Europe |
187 | | - versus the US. Output per person is not wildly different, but the |
188 | | - market proxy is. Europe did not stop growing; the listed-market |
189 | | - upside concentrated elsewhere. |
| 187 | + versus the US. Output per person remains in the same broad |
| 188 | + neighborhood, but market proxies do not. The claim is not that |
| 189 | + Europe stopped producing; it is that listed-equity gains and |
| 190 | + benchmark index weight accumulated much more strongly in the US. |
190 | 191 | </p> |
191 | 192 | <div class="story-stat-row"> |
192 | 193 | <span><strong>1.18x-1.26x</strong> Europe GDP/person</span> |
193 | 194 | <span><strong>0.43x-1.15x</strong> Europe ETF</span> |
194 | 195 | <span><strong>1.52x</strong> US ETF</span> |
195 | 196 | </div> |
196 | | - <div class="story-verdict-panel" aria-label="Conclusion verdict"> |
197 | | - <strong>Final read</strong> |
198 | | - <p> |
199 | | - The evidence does not support a simple European collapse |
200 | | - story. It supports a more specific claim: Europe continued to |
201 | | - grow, but was outpaced in capital markets, especially through |
202 | | - listed equity concentration in the US and in technology-heavy |
203 | | - sectors. The divergence is much sharper in market proxies than |
204 | | - in real output, and the gap opens around the 2008 crisis |
205 | | - window. |
206 | | - <!-- Europe kept growing, but the |
207 | | - market values shifted toward the US, especially through |
208 | | - listed equity concentration and technology-heavy sectors. --> |
209 | | - </p> |
210 | | - <p> |
211 | | - The limitation is equally important: these charts measure output |
212 | | - and listed capital, not the full well-being of households. |
213 | | - </p> |
214 | | - <p> |
215 | | - It leads to a final question: do market gains and indicators |
216 | | - really represent lived well-being trends? The data |
217 | | - demonstrates a divergence in perceived market values, but the |
218 | | - divergence is much smaller in real output terms. This |
219 | | - necessitates a deeper future focus on how and whether market |
220 | | - trends translate to broader economic welfare. |
221 | | - </p> |
222 | | - </div> |
223 | 197 | <button class="story-preset-button" type="button" data-story-action="wrap-up"> |
224 | 198 | Show final comparison |
225 | 199 | </button> |
@@ -394,28 +368,30 @@ <h3>MSCI ACWI sectors</h3> |
394 | 368 | <section class="story-close-panel" aria-label="Conclusion and limitations"> |
395 | 369 | <div class="section-kicker"> |
396 | 370 | <p class="eyebrow">Wrap up</p> |
397 | | - <h2>Europe is not simply falling behind. It is falling behind in a specific market story.</h2> |
| 371 | + <h2>Europe kept growing, but listed-equity gains and global index weight shifted toward the US.</h2> |
| 372 | + </div> |
| 373 | + <div class="story-verdict-panel story-verdict-panel--close" aria-label="Final read"> |
| 374 | + <strong>Final read</strong> |
398 | 375 | <p> |
399 | | - The evidence supports a narrower thesis: Europe continued to grow, |
400 | | - but the investable-market rewards, sector concentration, and global |
401 | | - index weight shifted more strongly toward the United States. The |
402 | | - final question is whether these indicators track broad well-being, |
403 | | - or mostly the returns to listed capital. |
| 376 | + The evidence does not support a simple European collapse story. |
| 377 | + GDP and GDP per capita reject that reading. The sharper divergence |
| 378 | + appears in ETF, market-cap, and ACWI views, where listed-equity |
| 379 | + rewards and global benchmark weight shift much more strongly toward |
| 380 | + the United States. |
| 381 | + </p> |
| 382 | + <p> |
| 383 | + The break-year check compares the same piecewise fit of the log |
| 384 | + US/Europe gap across candidate years. Those rankings repeatedly land |
| 385 | + near the 2008 crisis window, which makes the crisis period a |
| 386 | + plausible turning point for the market story even though the |
| 387 | + PPP-adjusted output split is milder. |
| 388 | + </p> |
| 389 | + <p> |
| 390 | + The limitation is equally important: these charts measure output |
| 391 | + and listed capital, not the full well-being of households. The |
| 392 | + next question is how far market gains track lived economic welfare |
| 393 | + rather than asset concentration. |
404 | 394 | </p> |
405 | | - </div> |
406 | | - <div class="story-close-grid"> |
407 | | - <article class="story-close-card"> |
408 | | - <h3>What the data can say</h3> |
409 | | - <p>GDP and GDP per capita reject a simple stagnation story. ETF, market-cap, and ACWI views show the sharper divergence.</p> |
410 | | - </article> |
411 | | - <article class="story-close-card"> |
412 | | - <h3>What it cannot fully say</h3> |
413 | | - <p>Market data does not measure public services, inequality, household balance sheets, or lived well-being directly.</p> |
414 | | - </article> |
415 | | - <article class="story-close-card"> |
416 | | - <h3>How to read the project</h3> |
417 | | - <p>Treat the guided story as the argument and the controls as the audit trail: change the indicator, year, and geography to look for exceptions.</p> |
418 | | - </article> |
419 | 395 | </div> |
420 | 396 | </section> |
421 | 397 |
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