[Critical] Test suite scale is inefficient: relocate unit suites into per-prefix subdirs

AGENTS.md

@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ Documentation must describe verified behavior, not plausible behavior.
 
 ### Adding a New Provider
 
-0. Check `docs/reference/REMOVED_PROVIDERS.md` first — providers removed at their operator's request must never be reintroduced (guarded by `tests/unit/removed-providers-blocklist.test.ts`)
+0. Check `docs/reference/REMOVED_PROVIDERS.md` first — providers removed at their operator's request must never be reintroduced (guarded by `tests/unit/providers/removed-providers-blocklist.test.ts`)
 1. Register in `src/shared/constants/providers.ts` (Zod-validated at load)
 2. Add executor in `open-sse/executors/` if custom logic needed (extend `BaseExecutor`)
 3. Add translator in `open-sse/translator/` if non-OpenAI format
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ the stale-enforcement added in Fase 6A.3.
 17. Never expose routes under `/api/services/` or `/dashboard/providers/services/*/embed/` without `isLocalOnlyPath()` classification in `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`. These routes can spawn child processes (`npm install`, `node`). Loopback enforcement happens unconditionally before any auth check — a leaked JWT via tunnel cannot trigger process spawning. See `docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md`.
 18. Every bug fix must be validated before shipping: a failing-then-passing unit/integration test (TDD) OR a documented live test on the production VPS (192.168.0.15). A fix without either is not merged. See Testing → "Bug fix / issue triage protocol" for the full decision tree.
 19. Never develop on the shared main checkout. Every development task runs in its own git worktree on its own dedicated branch, and you MUST confirm the base branch with the operator before creating the worktree/branch — never assume `main` or the currently checked-out branch. A `git checkout` in the shared checkout silently destroys other sessions' uncommitted work. Tear down only the worktrees/branches you created (by name, never `fix/*`/`feat/*` wildcards), leave other sessions' worktrees untouched, and end on the branch you started on (the active `release/vX.Y.Z`, never `main`). See Git Workflow → "Worktree isolation".
-20. PII redaction/sanitization is **opt-in — never on by default**. OmniRoute proxies for self-hosted/local LLMs where the operator owns the data, so mutating request/response payloads by default would silently corrupt legitimate traffic. The two data-mutating PII feature flags **MUST** keep `defaultValue: "false"` in `src/shared/constants/featureFlagDefinitions.ts`: `PII_REDACTION_ENABLED` (request-side) and `PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION` (response + streaming). All three application points — `src/lib/guardrails/piiMasker.ts` (request guardrail), `src/lib/piiSanitizer.ts` (response), `src/lib/streamingPiiTransform.ts` (SSE) — are gated on these flags; with both off the `pii-masker` guardrail still runs but never mutates payloads (data passes through untouched). Flipping either default to `"true"` requires explicit operator approval. The regression guard is `tests/unit/pii-opt-in-default.test.ts` (asserts both definition defaults + behavioral pass-through). Opt-in is per-operator via env or the settings/DB override (`src/lib/db/featureFlags.ts`), never a silent default. See `docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md`.
+20. PII redaction/sanitization is **opt-in — never on by default**. OmniRoute proxies for self-hosted/local LLMs where the operator owns the data, so mutating request/response payloads by default would silently corrupt legitimate traffic. The two data-mutating PII feature flags **MUST** keep `defaultValue: "false"` in `src/shared/constants/featureFlagDefinitions.ts`: `PII_REDACTION_ENABLED` (request-side) and `PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION` (response + streaming). All three application points — `src/lib/guardrails/piiMasker.ts` (request guardrail), `src/lib/piiSanitizer.ts` (response), `src/lib/streamingPiiTransform.ts` (SSE) — are gated on these flags; with both off the `pii-masker` guardrail still runs but never mutates payloads (data passes through untouched). Flipping either default to `"true"` requires explicit operator approval. The regression guard is `tests/unit/misc/pii-opt-in-default.test.ts` (asserts both definition defaults + behavioral pass-through). Opt-in is per-operator via env or the settings/DB override (`src/lib/db/featureFlags.ts`), never a silent default. See `docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md`.
 21. **Release-freeze — the FROZEN release branch belongs to the release captain; development does NOT stop (parallel-cycle model, 2026-07-04).** `/generate-release` opens a marker issue labeled `release-freeze` at the start of reconciliation (Phase 0a), **immediately cuts the next cycle's branch `release/vX+1` from the frozen tip (Phase 0a.0b — bump + living release PR + re-home of open PRs)**, and closes the freeze once the release PR squash-merges to `main`. Before merging **any** PR, every campaign workflow (`/review-prs`, `/review-group-prs`, `/merge-prs`, `/triage-fix-bugs`, `/implement-fix-bugs`, `/triage-features`, `/implement-features`, `/green-prs`, `/port-upstream-*`) **MUST** check `gh issue list --repo diegosouzapw/OmniRoute --label release-freeze --state open` — if a freeze is active: **NEVER merge into the frozen `release/vX.Y.Z` named in the freeze title**; instead resolve the ACTIVE development branch (the **highest** `release/v*` by semver — normally `release/vX+1`, announced in a freeze-issue comment) and **retarget the PR there** (`gh pr edit <N> --base release/vX+1`, then VERIFY with `gh pr view <N> --json baseRefName` — the edit fails silently) and merge normally. **HOLD only when the highest release/v\* branch IS the frozen one** (the short window before 0a.0b completes, or a pre-parallel-cycle release) — in that case leave the PR ready and open, tell the operator, and resume when the next branch appears or the freeze lifts. The just-shipped fixes reach `release/vX+1` via the Phase 5 sync-back (`scripts/release/sync-next-cycle.mjs`); do not try to sync mid-release. This is a **coordination signal, not a permission lock**: the release captain and the campaign sessions share the `diegosouzapw` identity, so a GitHub branch-protection lock cannot distinguish them — only this honored marker prevents the mid-release commit races that forced full CHANGELOG re-reconciliation in v3.8.40/v3.8.41 (a parallel campaign advanced `release/vX.Y.Z` by 34 commits mid-run). The release captain's own reconciliation/cycle-open pushes are exempt — they _are_ the release. Fixes that must land during a freeze (a homologation finding) follow the post-merge read-only rule: land on `main` first via `fix/release-vX.Y.Z-*`. **⛔ ONLY `/generate-release` may raise a release-freeze, and ONLY at its Phase 0a (start of generating a new version) — lifted at Phase 12c after the squash-merge to `main`.** No campaign, session, or agent may open a `release-freeze` marker at any other time — a freeze is **never** a mid-development coordination tool. If a session ever believes a freeze is genuinely, unavoidably necessary outside the `/generate-release` flow, it **MUST first ask the operator (`diegosouzapw`) in chat, explicitly alert "estou criando um freeze" and get an explicit yes** — never open, extend, or re-open a `release-freeze` autonomously. Conversely, do **not** close/lift an active `/generate-release` freeze to unblock campaign merges: it protects the captain's single clean CI run and auto-lifts at Phase 12c — closing it early re-triggers the exact commit race it prevents. Verify a freeze is legitimate before acting on it: an open `release-freeze` whose title/body references an **OPEN** release PR (`gh pr view <N> --json state`) is the authorized captain freeze — hold, don't touch. (Cycle-model proposal: `_tasks/finished/release-flow/2026-07-04_proposta-ciclo-paralelo-v2.md`.)
 22. **Cross-session safety — this repo is worked by MANY parallel sessions/agents at once; never step on another's in-flight work.** Two absolute bans, both recurring incidents (this rule exists because they keep happening):
     - **(a) Never `git stash` / `git stash pop` — ANYWHERE in this repo, including inside an isolated worktree, and including inside any subagent you dispatch.** `git stash` operates on the **shared repository object store**, not the per-worktree working tree — so a stash pushed or popped in one session can silently clobber or resurrect another parallel session's uncommitted changes. This is not hypothetical: 2026-07-02 a `#5923` quotaCache change leaked into the unrelated `#2296` worktree via a global `stash pop`, and the same class reincided through a **subagent**. To compare working changes against a base ref **without** stashing, use `git show <ref>:<path>` or `git diff <ref> -- <path>`; to confirm a typecheck/lint error is pre-existing on the base, inspect the base ref directly (`git show origin/release/vX.Y.Z:<path>`) — never stash your tree away to "get it clean". **Put this ban verbatim in the prompt of every subagent that touches git** (agents don't inherit this file's context — the recurrence was a subagent).

changelog.d/maintenance/12606-test-tiersplit.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+- **chore(tests):** split slow hermetic e2e (`tests/integration/e2e/`) and upstream-gated live (`tests/integration/live/`) out of the default `test:integration` glob so the default suite stays fast, and relocate unit suites into per-prefix subdirs with matching collectors ([#12606](https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/pull/12606)) — thanks @backryun