Reset withdrawable epoch when depositing to an exited builder - #5373
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jtraglia merged 2 commits intoJun 18, 2026
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) @0xMushow raised a point on discord that an attacker could continually deposit 1 ETH every `MIN_BUILDER_WITHDRAWABILITY_DELAY` epochs to prevent a builder from getting their balance back. One solution to this would be to only reset the withdrawalable epoch on top-ups if the balance has already been swept. This guarantees that the builder will get their balance back & prevents the original attack which this block of code prevented. See the following for more details: * #5373 Big thanks to @0xMushow for recognizing this!
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implements the following spec changes required to pass `v1.7.0-alpha.11` spec tests - ethereum/consensus-specs#5359 - ethereum/consensus-specs#5377 - ethereum/consensus-specs#5373 - ethereum/consensus-specs#5365 - ethereum/consensus-specs#5364 - ethereum/consensus-specs#5368 --------- Co-authored-by: NC <17676176+ensi321@users.noreply.github.com>
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@brech1 has pointed out an easy-to-abuse way of slowing down the validator sweep. This PR implements his suggested solution of resetting the builder's withdrawable epoch on deposit top-ups so that it cannot re-use those funds to sustain this attack. My napkin math tells me that it would require 75 ETH (~$150k) per minute to sustain this attack. This solution would prevent an attack from quickly getting that ETH back to re-deposit.
Note that EIP-8282 refactors this code, but there is value in having a separate PR ready for this now so we can judge/review it independently. I will handle the conflicts if/when we merge these two PRs.
PS: There's a discussion on discord about this.