Split shared config validation logger into per-file loggers

[Copilot]

internal/config/validation_shared.go existed only to declare a single package-level logValidation logger, reused across 7 other files (66 call sites). Since logger.ForFile() derives its debug namespace from where the variable is declared, all 66 call sites logged under config:validation_shared regardless of the actual emitting file — making DEBUG=config:* filtering misleading.

Changes

• Removed internal/config/validation_shared.go.
• Declared a dedicated logger.ForFile() logger directly in each file that previously used the shared one, so its namespace reflects the correct source file:
  • agent_policy.go → logAgentPolicy
  • expand.go → logExpand
  • validation_errors.go → logValidationErrors
  • validation_gateway.go → logValidationGateway
  • validation_rules.go → logValidationRules
  • validation_server.go → logValidationServer
  • validation_tracing.go → logValidationTracing
• Updated all call sites within each file to use its local logger variable.

No behavioral change — this only restores per-file DEBUG namespace accuracy for config validation logging.

• Fixes [refactor] Semantic Function Clustering Analysis: minor validation_shared.go logger namespace nit #12251

[Copilot]

🟢 Approval recommended

All shared logger references were consistently replaced with correctly scoped per-file loggers.

Pull request overview

Splits config validation logging into per-file loggers so DEBUG namespaces identify the actual source file.

Changes:

• Adds dedicated logger.ForFile() instances across seven config files.
• Updates all 66 references and removes the obsolete shared logger file.

File summaries

File	Description
internal/config/agent_policy.go	Adds the agent-policy logger.
internal/config/expand.go	Adds the expansion logger.
internal/config/validation_errors.go	Adds the validation-error logger.
internal/config/validation_gateway.go	Adds the gateway-validation logger.
internal/config/validation_rules.go	Adds the rule-validation logger.
internal/config/validation_server.go	Adds the server-validation logger.
internal/config/validation_shared.go	Removes the shared logger declaration.
internal/config/validation_tracing.go	Adds the tracing-validation logger.

Review details

• Files reviewed: 8/8 changed files
• Comments generated: 0
• Review effort level: Balanced

---

💡 Add a code-review agent skill or configure MCP servers for context-aware, tailored reviews. Learn more in the docs.

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — gVisor

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: gVisor (runsc) kernel-level isolation

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (issues/PRs/file/commits)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (list_issues, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: Gateway exposed 23 read-only tools, zero write tools. All 7 write attempts returned unknown tool [-32602] — confirms GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1 prevents backend registration, but does not independently confirm gateway DIFC/guard enforcement. No write leaked.

⚠️ Parts D & E: gh not authenticated in this environment. REST/GraphQL token-scope boundary untestable. All D/E rows INCONCLUSIVE.

No writes succeeded. Zero FAILs. RESULT=INCONCLUSIVE RUNTIME=gvisor RUNID=33449217297

References: §33449217297

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (gVisor runtime) by Read-Only Stress: gVisor runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — docker-sbx

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: docker-sbx (KVM-isolated microVM)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (issues/PRs/file/commits)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all tools absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (issues/PRs via github CLI)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: All 23 exposed MCP tools are read-only; no write tools appear in the catalog. The backend runs with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1, so write tools are never registered — this confirms gh-aw's defense-in-depth but does not independently confirm gateway-level DIFC/guard enforcement (write calls never reach a write-capable backend). All Part B rows are INCONCLUSIVE per methodology.

⚠️ Parts D & E: gh reports GH_TOKEN is invalid/unauthenticated in this environment. No REST or GraphQL write could be attempted. All Part D/E rows are INCONCLUSIVE — the token-scope boundary cannot be validated in this run.

No writes leaked. No FAIL conditions triggered.

References: §33449217230

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (docker-sbx runtime) by Read-Only Stress: docker-sbx runtime

[github-actions]

🔒 mcpg Read-Only Stress — default AWF

Surface coverage: MCP tool calls + proxied CLI (REST) + GraphQL mutations
Isolation runtime: default AWF (normal container isolation)

Part	Surface	Op	Result	Expected	Status
A	MCP	reads (issues/PRs/file/commits)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
B	MCP	writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/branch/file/PR)	all tools absent from catalog	BLOCKED	⚠️
C	CLI	reads (list_issues, get_file_contents)	data returned	ALLOWED	✅
D	CLI	REST writes (reaction/star/issue/comment/file)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️
E	CLI	GraphQL mutations (addReaction/addStar/createIssue)	gh unauthenticated	BLOCKED	⚠️

Overall: INCONCLUSIVE

⚠️ Part B: All 7 write tools (add_issue_comment, star_repository, issue_write, create_branch, create_or_update_file, create_pull_request) were absent from the MCP tool catalog (backend launched with GITHUB_READ_ONLY=1; only 23 read-only tools registered). Refusals prove gh-aw framework defense-in-depth, not gateway-level DIFC enforcement. No write succeeded.

⚠️ Parts D/E: gh is not authenticated in this environment — all write attempts failed with "set GH_TOKEN environment variable", not a real API 403. Cannot confirm token-scope boundary.

No write leaked. Gateway DIFC/guard enforcement was not independently exercised on this run due to structural limitations (backend never registers write tools; gh CLI unauthenticated). Independent confirmation of gateway write-blocking is covered by internal/guard and internal/difc unit tests.

References: §33449217272

🔒 mcpg read-only stress (default AWF runtime) by Read-Only Stress: default runtime