Summary
After PR #37118 / CVE-2026-25714
(fix: Unify public-only token filtering in API queries and repo access checks,
merged 2026-05-18, backport #37773 to 1.26.2 — the May 2026 unification pass
for public-only token filtering, reporter Medoedus per the 1.26.2 release notes),
the public-only PAT scope is still bypassable on Repository and Package
scope categories when the owner's Visibility = Limited (instance-internal).
The sibling Org / User / ActivityPub cases in the same checkTokenPublicOnly
switch correctly reject Limited owners via !Visibility.IsPublic(). The
Repository / Package cases use repo.IsPrivate or Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate(),
both of which return false for VisibleTypeLimited — so a public-only PAT
strictly exceeds anonymous reach on a Limited owner.
Tested on gitea/gitea:1.26.2. The decisive marker is that PR #37118's
unification IS applied in the version under test (User-category PROBE returns
403 "token scope is limited to public users"). Despite that, the
Repository-category PROBE on the same Limited owner with the same PAT returns
200 and serves content.
Affected entry points (4 spots)
| File:Line |
Function |
Affected surface |
routers/api/v1/api.go:292 |
checkTokenPublicOnly Package case |
API v1 packages |
routers/api/packages/api.go:76 |
reqPackageAccess middleware |
All 24 native package registries (/api/packages/<type>/...) |
services/context/api.go |
TokenCanAccessRepo helper |
All API v1 Repository-category endpoints — content, issues, PRs, releases, labels, milestones, etc. |
services/context/permission.go:32 |
CheckTokenScopes (called via CheckRepoScopedToken) |
Web download endpoints /raw, /media, /attachments. LFS routes (services/lfs/server.go:470/472, services/lfs/locks.go:62/151/216/284) also chain through this helper. |
All four sinks check repo.IsPrivate or Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() only.
VisibleTypeLimited falls through.
// modules/structs/visible_type.go
func (vt VisibleType) IsPrivate() bool { return vt == VisibleTypePrivate } // line 39-40
func (vt VisibleType) IsLimited() bool { return vt == VisibleTypeLimited } // line 33-34
Same-file evidence (routers/api/v1/api.go:246-299 after PR #37118)
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryOrganization:
orgPrivate := ... && !ctx.Org.Organization.Visibility.IsPublic() // !IsPublic ✓
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryUser:
if ... && !ctx.ContextUser.Visibility.IsPublic() { ... } // !IsPublic ✓
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryActivityPub:
if ... && !ctx.ContextUser.Visibility.IsPublic() { ... } // !IsPublic ✓
case auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryPackage:
if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() { // IsPrivate ONLY ✗
ctx.APIError(http.StatusForbidden, "token scope is limited to public packages")
return
}
TokenCanAccessRepo (services/context/api.go) reduces to !repo.IsPrivate:
// A public-only token cannot reach a private repo; any other token is unrestricted by this check.
func (ctx *APIContext) TokenCanAccessRepo(repo *repo_model.Repository) bool {
return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || !repo.IsPrivate
}
CheckTokenScopes (services/context/permission.go:32):
if publicOnly && repo != nil && repo.IsPrivate {
ctx.HTTPError(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
PoC (Docker e2e VERIFIED on gitea/gitea:1.26.2, 2026-06-05)
Full script in the report (run-poc.sh). Setup:
- Create user
limuser. PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/limuser with body
{"visibility":"limited", ...} — response confirms "visibility":"limited".
- Upload a generic package as
limuser:
PUT /api/packages/limuser/generic/secretpkg/1.0.0/secret.txt with body
secret-content-internal-only → 201.
- Create user
attacker.
- Mint PAT for
attacker with scopes=["read:package","read:user","read:repository","public-only"].
Result on gitea/gitea:1.26.2 — nine PROBEs:
PROBE A (download package via attacker PAT)
HTTP=200 Body: secret-content-internal-only
PROBE C (read README of limuser's PUBLIC repo)
HTTP=200 Body: {"name":"README.md", ...}
PROBE F (sanity — User category, same PAT, same owner)
HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"token scope is limited to public users"}
PROBE G (Repository category, same PAT, same owner)
HTTP=200 Body: {"name":"README.md", ...} ← bypass
PROBE H (list limuser's repos, User category)
HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"token scope is limited to public users"}
PROBE M (git HTTPS smart protocol — info/refs)
HTTP=200 Body: 001e# service=git-upload-pack ... HEAD ... ← full clone enabled
PROBE N (write attempt: POST contents/hacked.txt)
HTTP=403 Body: {"message":"user should have a permission to write to the target branch"}
Integrity:N confirmed
PROBE O (Limited ORG — same bypass class)
Org category : HTTP=403 {"message":"token scope is limited to public orgs"}
Repo category : HTTP=200 README content ← bypass
Anonymous baseline (no auth) on every above endpoint: HTTP=401/404
Gitea's own server error string in PROBE F / H / O — "token scope is limited
to public users" / "public orgs" — is the explicit declaration of intent.
Repository / Package category violates that intent on the same Limited owner.
Why this is not a duplicate of CVE-2026-25714
CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 (the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token
filtering, merged 2026-05-18, backported to 1.26.2 via PR #37773) realigned
checkTokenPublicOnly's Org / User / ActivityPub cases on !Visibility.IsPublic()
and introduced the TokenCanAccessRepo helper for the Repository / Issue /
Notification cases.
PROBE F on 1.26.2 returns 403 "token scope is limited to public users" for
the User category — i.e. PR #37118's unification IS in effect on the version
under test. The Repository / Package leak occurs after that fix; the Limited
gap is the next residual issue on the same hygiene effort (the Package case was
not touched, and TokenCanAccessRepo reduces to !repo.IsPrivate without
consulting owner visibility), not the same bug.
Suggested fix (4 spots, 1-line shape each)
// routers/api/v1/api.go:292 (checkTokenPublicOnly Package case)
- if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() {
+ if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() {
// routers/api/packages/api.go:76 (reqPackageAccess middleware)
- if ctx.Package != nil && ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPrivate() {
+ if ctx.Package != nil && !ctx.Package.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic() {
// services/context/api.go (TokenCanAccessRepo helper)
- return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly || !repo.IsPrivate
+ return repo == nil || !ctx.PublicOnly ||
+ (!repo.IsPrivate && repo.Owner != nil && repo.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic())
// services/context/permission.go:32 (CheckTokenScopes)
- if publicOnly && repo != nil && repo.IsPrivate {
+ if publicOnly && repo != nil &&
+ (repo.IsPrivate || (repo.Owner != nil && !repo.Owner.Visibility.IsPublic())) {
This aligns the Repository / Package categories with the User / Org / ActivityPub
siblings already shipped in PR #37118.
Dup-check (re-verified 2026-06-06 18:14 KST)
| Axis |
Result |
| GHSA list |
None of the published advisories mention the Limited-visibility predicate (IsPrivate() vs !IsPublic()). CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 is the parent hygiene effort, not the same bug — see disambiguation above. |
PR search (Limited visibility public-only, VisibleTypeLimited, TokenCanAccessRepo, Package public-only) |
No PR proposes the fix. |
Issue search (Limited public-only, internal user token, etc.) |
Nothing tracks this. |
| Recent commits to the 4 affected files (since 2026-04-01) |
PR #32204 / #37118 / #37773 / #37698 / #37583 — none close the Limited gap. |
Open + closed PR body grep (GHSA-/CVE-2026-28744/VisibleType) |
No in-flight PR. |
OSV.dev cross-check on gitea |
0 results for Limited / public-only / token-scope. |
NVD gitea + public-only |
0 results. |
Reporter
JebeenLee
Summary
After PR #37118 / CVE-2026-25714
(
fix: Unify public-only token filtering in API queries and repo access checks,merged 2026-05-18, backport
#37773to 1.26.2 — the May 2026 unification passfor public-only token filtering, reporter Medoedus per the 1.26.2 release notes),
the
public-onlyPAT scope is still bypassable on Repository and Packagescope categories when the owner's
Visibility = Limited(instance-internal).The sibling
Org/User/ActivityPubcases in the samecheckTokenPublicOnlyswitch correctly reject Limited owners via
!Visibility.IsPublic(). TheRepository / Package cases use
repo.IsPrivateorOwner.Visibility.IsPrivate(),both of which return
falseforVisibleTypeLimited— so apublic-onlyPATstrictly exceeds anonymous reach on a Limited owner.
Tested on
gitea/gitea:1.26.2. The decisive marker is that PR #37118'sunification IS applied in the version under test (User-category PROBE returns
403 "token scope is limited to public users"). Despite that, theRepository-category PROBE on the same Limited owner with the same PAT returns
200and serves content.Affected entry points (4 spots)
routers/api/v1/api.go:292checkTokenPublicOnlyPackage caserouters/api/packages/api.go:76reqPackageAccessmiddleware/api/packages/<type>/...)services/context/api.goTokenCanAccessRepohelperservices/context/permission.go:32CheckTokenScopes(called viaCheckRepoScopedToken)/raw,/media,/attachments. LFS routes (services/lfs/server.go:470/472,services/lfs/locks.go:62/151/216/284) also chain through this helper.All four sinks check
repo.IsPrivateorOwner.Visibility.IsPrivate()only.VisibleTypeLimitedfalls through.Same-file evidence (
routers/api/v1/api.go:246-299after PR #37118)TokenCanAccessRepo(services/context/api.go) reduces to!repo.IsPrivate:CheckTokenScopes(services/context/permission.go:32):PoC (Docker e2e VERIFIED on
gitea/gitea:1.26.2, 2026-06-05)Full script in the report (
run-poc.sh). Setup:limuser.PATCH /api/v1/admin/users/limuserwith body{"visibility":"limited", ...}— response confirms"visibility":"limited".limuser:PUT /api/packages/limuser/generic/secretpkg/1.0.0/secret.txtwith bodysecret-content-internal-only→201.attacker.attackerwithscopes=["read:package","read:user","read:repository","public-only"].Result on
gitea/gitea:1.26.2— nine PROBEs:Gitea's own server error string in PROBE F / H / O — "token scope is limited
to public users" / "public orgs" — is the explicit declaration of intent.
Repository / Package category violates that intent on the same Limited owner.
Why this is not a duplicate of CVE-2026-25714
CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 (the May 2026 unification pass for public-only token
filtering, merged 2026-05-18, backported to 1.26.2 via PR #37773) realigned
checkTokenPublicOnly's Org / User / ActivityPub cases on!Visibility.IsPublic()and introduced the
TokenCanAccessRepohelper for the Repository / Issue /Notification cases.
PROBE F on
1.26.2returns403 "token scope is limited to public users"forthe User category — i.e. PR #37118's unification IS in effect on the version
under test. The Repository / Package leak occurs after that fix; the Limited
gap is the next residual issue on the same hygiene effort (the Package case was
not touched, and
TokenCanAccessReporeduces to!repo.IsPrivatewithoutconsulting owner visibility), not the same bug.
Suggested fix (4 spots, 1-line shape each)
This aligns the Repository / Package categories with the User / Org / ActivityPub
siblings already shipped in PR #37118.
Dup-check (re-verified 2026-06-06 18:14 KST)
IsPrivate()vs!IsPublic()). CVE-2026-25714 / PR #37118 is the parent hygiene effort, not the same bug — see disambiguation above.Limited visibility public-only,VisibleTypeLimited,TokenCanAccessRepo,Package public-only)Limited public-only,internal user token, etc.)GHSA-/CVE-2026-28744/VisibleType)giteagitea + public-onlyReporter
JebeenLee