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Remote security boundary

Dirac remains in local security mode unless DIRAC_SECURITY_MODE=remote is explicitly set. Remote mode is a different trust boundary, not a LAN toggle. It refuses to start without a valid hashed-token file and refuses to bind a public interface. TLS terminates at the reverse proxy; the Python service listens only on loopback and requires X-Forwarded-Proto: https.

Provision a credential

Run bin/dirac-token-hash in a TTY. Put only the printed SHA-256 digest in a root/operator-readable copy of deploy/dirac-tokens.example.json; the raw token goes to the human or agent that owns it and must not enter this repository, systemd, logs, URLs or audit rows.

Each credential binds one stable actor identity to explicit scopes and four ceilings: rolling requests per minute, UTC-day requests, UTC-day compute-cost units, and request bytes. A request-body actor cannot override that identity. Method invocation and artifact reading are separately scoped. Command adapters are separately scoped too: for example, structure.field.compute requires both command:structure.field.compute:execute and the resolved method:fields.qm.homo:invoke (or a matching wildcard). This prevents a command adapter from becoming a privilege bypass around the method boundary.

Put HTTPS in front

Use deploy/Caddyfile.remote.example after replacing its hostname. Apply deploy/systemd/dirac-fields-remote.conf.example as a user-unit drop-in, point DIRAC_TOKEN_FILE at the protected credential file, reload systemd, and restart the service. Do not enable remote mode before the reverse proxy is serving HTTPS.

The Python SDK reads the raw client credential from DIRAC_TOKEN; TypeScript accepts an explicit memory-only token constructor option. Neither client writes the token to disk. Query parameters are never an authentication mechanism.

Enforcement and evidence

  • Missing/invalid credentials, missing scope, rate, quota and TLS refusals use the canonical error vocabulary.
  • Expensive work is charged before execution. PostgreSQL updates the daily usage row atomically, so concurrent calls cannot overspend by racing.
  • audit.remote_request records actor, token fingerprint, route, scopes, status, byte counts, cost and duration. It never stores request bodies, Authorization, cookies, raw tokens or query values.
  • If durable quota accounting is unavailable, remote work fails closed with DB_UNAVAILABLE; it does not run unmetered.
  • Content-addressed artifact bytes require their own artifact:read scope.

This profile is implemented and testable without making this workstation a public deployment. Choosing a public hostname, exposing a firewall port and issuing real credentials remain operator actions because they change the external trust boundary.