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fix(client/auth): discard stored client registrations whose secret has expired - #3264

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fix/oauth-discard-expired-client-registration
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fix/oauth-discard-expired-client-registration

fix(client/auth): re-check secret expiry in the 401 flow; document th…

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Claude / Claude Code Review completed Aug 7, 2026 in 5m 51s

Code review found 4 potential issues

Found 4 candidates, confirmed 4. See review comments for details.

Details

Severity Count
🔴 Important 0
🟡 Nit 4
🟣 Pre-existing 0
Severity File:Line Issue
🟡 Nit src/mcp/client/auth/oauth2.py:638-646 Expiry discard preempts the SEP-2352 issuer-mismatch cleanup
🟡 Nit src/mcp/client/auth/oauth2.py:639-647 Mid-session expiry re-check misses the refresh path and the 403 step-up path

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Check warning on line 646 in src/mcp/client/auth/oauth2.py

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@claude claude / Claude Code Review

Expiry discard preempts the SEP-2352 issuer-mismatch cleanup

The new expiry discards (in `_initialize` and at the top of the 401 handler) null `context.client_info` before the SEP-2352 issuer-binding checks — which are guarded on `client_info is not None` and read the issuer stamp from `client_info.issuer` — so a record that is both expired and issuer-mismatched (AS migration) now skips the SEP-2352 cleanup (`clear_tokens()` + `oauth_metadata = None`) that fired pre-PR. The old issuer's kept refresh token can then later be presented to the new AS's token 

Check warning on line 647 in src/mcp/client/auth/oauth2.py

See this annotation in the file changed.

@claude claude / Claude Code Review

Mid-session expiry re-check misses the refresh path and the 403 step-up path

The new mid-session `stored_registration_expired()` re-check only runs inside the 401 branch, but `prepare_token_auth()` is also reached from two other paths when the secret lapses after `_initialize()`: the refresh branch (`can_refresh_token()` ignores expiry, so one refresh presents the dead secret and fails `invalid_client` before self-healing via the subsequent 401), and the 403 `insufficient_scope` step-up, where the live access token keeps the 401 discard from ever running — each 403 burns