Impact
HistoryTreeProof::verify panics on a malformed proof where history.len() != positions.len() due to assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len()).
The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (ResponseTransactionsProof.proof) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.
Patches
The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.3.0.
Workarounds
No known workarounds know.
References
See PR.
Impact
HistoryTreeProof::verifypanics on a malformed proof wherehistory.len() != positions.len()due toassert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len()).The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (
ResponseTransactionsProof.proof) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch.Patches
The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.3.0.
Workarounds
No known workarounds know.
References
See PR.