You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
Commit 0027ae7
Browse filesBrowse the repository at this point in the historyBrowse files
The `/auth/me` endpoints resolve their caller through `@objectstack/core`'s `resolveRequestExecutionContext`, the one request-to-`ExecutionContext` composition
6
+
7
+
Clause-②: no
8
+
9
+
-`makeExecutionContextResolver`, which `GET /auth/me/permissions`, `GET /auth/me/localization` and `GET /me/apps` call, resolves the caller by calling `resolveRequestExecutionContext` with this door's differences as named parameters: `anonymous: 'fail-closed'`, `authGate: 'withhold'`, `credentials: 'session-only'`, `sessionApi: 'required'`, `session: 'request'`, no tenancy posture, `localization: 'withhold'`, no request locale, `accessToken: 'withhold'`, and no OAuth provenance or admission channel. The per-request service reads, the environment-kernel resolution and the fail-closed `catch` stay at the door. Every platform door that resolves a request's caller now calls the one composition.
10
+
- One answer changes. When the auth service's session read carries `session.userId` but no `user.id` (no user object, a user without an id, or `user.id: null`), these endpoints answered as signed out; they now answer as signed in as that user, which is how the runtime dispatcher, REST, the settings routes and the storage download already read it. No session producer yields that shape: in this repository better-auth's session read returns no session when the session's user is missing and plugin-auth passes its read through, and cloud's control plane uses the same plugin-auth read.
11
+
- Every other answer is unchanged: no credential, an unrecognised cookie, a failing session read, an API key alone and a host with no auth service get each route's signed-out body; a session the authentication policy holds is still served on these allow-listed routes, with no `authGate` on its context; an unreadable permission store is still the host's `503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE`.
12
+
- Nothing to do for a consumer: no export, route, configuration key or response shape changed.
fix(objectql,runtime): a hook whose `handler` names a function gets `ctx.title(field?)` in-process, as an inline handler and a `body` do
8
+
9
+
Clause-②: yes (widening)
10
+
11
+
-**What was wrong.** A hook whose `handler` is a string naming a function ran in-process without `ctx.title`: `defineStack({ functions })` plus a hook naming an entry on a source boot (`@objectstack/verify`'s `bootStack(config)`, `os serve` over a config), and a string `handler` resolved from the artifact's `runtimeModule` (what `objectstack build` ships for a callable it could not lower to a `body`). The engine's binder resolved the name after the runtime had wrapped the inline handlers, so the function was called with the bare engine context and `await ctx.title()` threw `TypeError: ctx.title is not a function`.
12
+
-**What changed.**`bindHooksToEngine` (`@objectstack/objectql`) takes a `wrapHandler(handler, hook)` option, applied at bind to every handler a hook runs in-process, after a string `handler` resolves: an inline function, a name from the bind's `functions`, or a name the same package registered on the engine. A `body`'s handler (built by `bodyRunner`) never takes it. `ObjectQL.bindHooks` and the `IObjectQLEngine.bindHooks` contract (`@objectstack/spec`) carry the option. `bindAppArtifactHandlers` (`@objectstack/runtime`) passes the existing `withInProcessHookTitle` through it, in place of wrapping inline handlers before the bind, so the inline and the named handler take one wrap.
13
+
-**Unchanged.** A bind that passes no `wrapHandler` binds every handler exactly as resolved, so a host or harness that calls `bindHooks` itself, and a hook registered with `ql.registerHook(...)`, are not handed `ctx.title`. `HookContext` still declares no `title`.
fix(objectql): a record read that hydrates a file field no longer makes a `sys_file` access attempt for a reader without `sys_file` read
6
+
7
+
The engine expands a stored file id by reading `sys_file`, and it issued that read as the caller. A member who may read the record but not `sys_file` (the platform default) was refused it, and the security layer logged `[Security] Access denied: operation 'find' on object 'sys_file'` at WARN on every by-id and list read by that member, although the body served was right. Those lines buried the real denials in the operator's log.
8
+
9
+
The engine now asks the security service's `canReadObject('sys_file')` first, the same object-level read gate the security middleware applies, and serves a refused caller the field-owned answer without the read. Nothing else changes:
10
+
11
+
- The served body is byte-identical, by id and by list, for a reader with and without `sys_file` read. A file owned by the record still hydrates, and every other id still reads `{ id, metadataRefused: true }`.
12
+
- A direct `GET /api/v1/data/sys_file/:id` by the same reader still answers `403 PERMISSION_DENIED` and still logs its denial.
13
+
- With no security service, or one that offers no `canReadObject`, the engine reads as the caller, as before.
14
+
15
+
The ask is one cached permission check per read, not per row.
16
+
17
+
Clause-②: no (no accept set or public surface moves: the served bodies and every refusal are unchanged; owes the seat's review of record at `TIER_DEFAULT` before the queue)
fix: an activity row is written only when an organization is derivable, never with a NULL organization, and the v18 ownership ceremony deletes the existing NULL activity rows it cannot attribute (ADR-0131 D9)
7
+
8
+
Clause-②: no
9
+
10
+
-**`@objectstack/plugin-audit`.** The audit writer's activity mirror (`sys_activity`) takes its organization from the record, then from the acting session, then from the `tenancy` service's Default Organization under `single`. When none of them names one, the mirror now writes no activity row at all. Before, it wrote a row with `organization_id` NULL. Under a wall that row was readable by no organization member. The change is still recorded: the compliance ledger row (`sys_audit_log`) is written as before, with its `tenant_id` attribution. Under `single` the Default Organization is always derivable, so nothing changes there. A record that names its organization keeps its activity row, with that organization.
11
+
-**`@objectstack/cli`.**`os migrate organization-ownership` still attributes a NULL `sys_activity` row when its record carries an organization. On a walled database (any posture but `single`), the mirror-deletion step now deletes the NULL rows no anchor attributes, such as activity about a sign-up's `sys_user`. Before, those rows were reported as unattributable and held certification. They are 14-day telemetry that the mirror no longer writes, and `sys_audit_log` keeps each change. The plan counts them as the departure `underivable-activity`, and warns before the first write that `--apply` deletes them. The apply report lists the count as the table's `deleted`. Under `single` the Default Organization takes these rows, as before, and nothing is deleted.
Clause-②: no (copy only: no accept set or public surface moves; owes the seat's review of record at `TIER_DEFAULT` before the queue)
6
+
7
+
fix(mcp): the Connect-an-Agent page subtitle says "this system"
8
+
9
+
-**What changed.** The Connect-an-Agent page header now reads "Give any MCP-capable AI client governed access to this system — every call runs under the caller's own permissions and row-level security." Inside the running system, user-facing copy names the system the caller is in as "this system".
10
+
-**Unchanged.** The page's name, layout, components and navigation entries, and every MCP route and payload.
-**What changed.** Inside the running system, user-facing copy names the system the user is in as "this system". The `sys_sso_provider` object description ("External SSO identity providers (OIDC / SAML) this system federates login to"), the `clientId` help text of its Register SSO Provider action ("OAuth client ID issued by the IdP for this system."), and the OAuth applications grid's empty state ("Register an application to let its clients sign users in with this system.") now say so. The `en` copy of the Connect-an-Agent page subtitle follows the page's new text.
10
+
-**Translations.** The zh-CN, ja-JP and es-ES values of the same strings are re-translated, and the recorded source hash of the Connect-an-Agent subtitle moves to the new English text in all three, so those locales keep serving their translation rather than falling back to English.
11
+
-**Unchanged.** Every object, field, action and page name, and all behaviour.
0 commit comments