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Merge origin/main into claude/project-thread-jhc8or
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QsR2jTJ27J6P6KVq74iiqQ
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---
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'@objectstack/platform-objects': patch
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---
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i18n(platform-objects): the platform objects, Setup, Studio and Account ship in Korean
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Clause-②: no
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Metadata-protocol: none
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`@objectstack/platform-objects` now carries `ko` beside `en`, `zh-CN`, `ja-JP`, `es-ES`, `zh-Hant`, `ar`, `fr`, `pt-BR`, `ru` and `de`: every `sys_*` object (labels, fields, help, options, views, actions and their dialogs), the metadata-type configuration forms Studio opens, the Setup, Studio and Account navigation, the System Overview dashboard and its datasets, the platform pages' titles, and the inline copy on the user and organization record pages. A user whose locale is `ko` no longer reads English `sys_*` labels in the console. The new bundles pass through the same source-hash fallback as the existing ones, and every hand-authored leaf records the digest of the source it was translated from. The extract config documents `ko` in its `--locales`, so `check:i18n` now gates the new bundles. Package 11 of #30512, the last of its seven locales.
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'@objectstack/objectql': patch
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'@objectstack/metadata-protocol': patch
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feat(objectql, metadata-protocol): one package-scoped resolver for behavioural metadata, and one declared dependency closure for it and the save door (ADR-0150 D3/D4)
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Clause-②: no
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Metadata-protocol: none
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- **`@objectstack/objectql`** exports `resolvePackageScopedName`, the resolution rule of ADR-0150 D3 for the metadata types addressed by `(package, name)` (`PACKAGE_SCOPED_TYPES`). A caller of package P is answered P's own item, else the unique holder in P's declared dependency closure plus the `sys` packages, else a refusal that names every candidate; a caller with no package is answered the environment's own item, else the unique package holder, else the refusal. Zero holders is `not-found`. The platform-requested name `guest_portal` resolves environment-wide whatever the caller. `SchemaRegistry` gains three read-only methods the resolver reads, `packageScopedHoldersOf`, `getPackageScopedItem` and `getEnvironmentScopedItem`, which apply the per-package overlay slot (ADR-0150 D4): a stored overlay binds to the package whose item it customizes, so it never shadows another package's same-named item there.
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- **`@objectstack/metadata-protocol`** exports `packageDependencyClosure`, a package's declared dependency closure (its manifest's `dependencies`, transitively, with an App's customization pair widened by the App's members). The save door's write scope now calls it, so the closure a write is judged against and the closure a name resolves in are one implementation.
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Nothing changes for a running deployment: no reader calls the resolver yet, `getItem` keeps serving the bare slot first to every caller, the one-holder refusal of ADR-0048 §3.4 stays in force, and the save door admits and refuses exactly what it did.
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'@objectstack/plugin-security': patch
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fix(plugin-security)!: a delegate can neither capture nor evict a direct grant beyond its scope
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Clause-②: no (narrowing) — an edit that points a direct permission-set grant at another user is judged on both holders it touches, the user it takes the grant from and the user it gives the grant to, and an edit that re-names a stored grant's set is judged on the set it takes away as well as the set it grants, so a delegated administrator no longer moves a grant away from a holder outside its subtree or from a holder it cannot read, nor re-names a stored grant of a set outside its allowlist. Nothing is widened: no export, error code or status is added.
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Metadata-protocol: none
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<!-- adr-0087: not-required (no-migration-prescription) No key of any schema is added, removed, renamed or re-shaped, and no export of the package entry changes: a direct grant keeps its shape and meaning, each holder an edit touches is judged as a target user already is, and the set an edit takes away is judged as the removal of that grant already judges it. There is nothing for a migration to rewrite and no tombstone. -->
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**BREAKING** accept-set narrowing in the delegated-administration gate (`@objectstack/plugin-security`), only for a delegated administrator editing a stored direct grant's holder or set.
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- **Rule.** A delegate can neither capture nor evict a direct grant beyond its scope (ADR-0090 D12). A delegated write on a direct permission-set grant is judged on every holder and every set it touches. An edit that points a stored grant at another user is judged on the holder it takes the grant from and on the holder it gives the grant to, each exactly as the gate judges a target user — through the caller's own read, and inside the subtree only through one of the subtree's business units. An edit that re-names a stored grant's permission set is judged on the set it takes away exactly as the removal of that grant judges it — the allowlist, the security catalog and strict containment — beside the set it re-names the grant to, judged as before.
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- **What a caller sees.** An edit with either holder outside the subtree, or a holder the caller cannot read, answers `403 DELEGATION_SCOPE_VIOLATION`, with the sentence and details of every target outside the subtree, whichever end it is. A re-name away from a set outside the allowlist answers the refusal the removal of that grant answers — `403 DELEGATION_SCOPE_VIOLATION`, "permission set '…' is not in the scope's allowlist", with that set in its details — and a re-name away from a set whose removal is refused on any other ground gets that refusal. The stored holder and the stored set are named only when the caller reads them. A stored grant that names no holder is moved only by a tenant-level administrator (`403 PERMISSION_DENIED`).
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- **Unchanged.** The judgment of the set an edit points a grant at; an edit that keeps both the holder and the set, an insert and a removal; a tenant-level administrator's writes; an organization administrator's writes, whose right creates and removes a grant and never edits one in place.
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- **Who moves.** A delegate can no longer move a direct grant away from a holder outside its subtree, nor re-name a stored grant of a set outside its allowlist. A holder it cannot read counts as outside its subtree, and a grant it could not remove it cannot re-name. Such a grant is moved or re-named by a tenant-level administrator, or removed and granted anew by an administrator whose boundary covers it.

‎content/docs/permissions/delegated-administration.mdx‎

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| Rule | Effect |
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|---|---|
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| Tenant admins pass through | The superuser wildcard reaches the ordinary CRUD/RLS checks — delegation constrains *delegates*, not HQ |
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| Subtree anchoring | Assignments a delegate creates must be anchored (`sys_user_position.business_unit_id`) inside their subtree, and the target user must sit inside it |
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| Allowlist, no self-escalation | Every set reached by the write — bound to the assigned position, or granted directly — must be on `assignablePermissionSets`. Granting an un-allowlisted set is refused **for anyone, including the delegate themselves** |
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| Subtree anchoring | Assignments a delegate creates must be anchored (`sys_user_position.business_unit_id`) inside their subtree, and the target user must sit inside it. A direct grant's holder must too, at both ends of an edit that moves the grant to another user: a delegate can neither capture nor evict a direct grant beyond its subtree |
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| Allowlist, no self-escalation | Every set reached by the write — bound to the assigned position, or granted directly — must be on `assignablePermissionSets`. Granting an un-allowlisted set is refused **for anyone, including the delegate themselves**. An edit that re-names a stored direct grant is judged on the set it takes away as well, exactly as removing that grant is: a delegate can neither capture nor evict a direct grant beyond its scope |
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| Action flag | `manageAssignments` gates the assignment rows — `sys_user_position`, and direct `sys_user_permission_set` grants — and is the scope's only action right. A position's sets are part of its definition and a permission set is a definition: both are written through the metadata door, which admits a `manage_metadata` holder (the platform operator under `group` or `isolated`) and reads no `adminScope` (ADR-0131 D3). The scope's former `manageBindings` and `authorEnvironmentSets` named the retired `sys_position_permission_set` and `sys_permission_set` rows, admitted no write once those objects were gone, and are retired: the schema refuses both with the fix |
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| Strict containment | Granting a set that itself carries an `adminScope` — assigning a position that distributes it, or granting it directly — requires a held scope that **strictly contains** it: the same root, no wider subtree, `manageAssignments` only if yours has it, an allowlist inside yours, and smaller on at least one of those. Handing your own exact scope to a peer is refused (no lateral propagation) |
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| Single-row writes | Delegates write single rows by id only — a broad filter-write cannot be boundary-checked |

‎docs/adr/0134-env-side-scim-provisioning.md‎

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That is the decision, not an oversight: a group→role mapping is an authorization contract, and V1
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declines to invent one. Filling the seam is a later decision with its own record.
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> **Filled by [ADR-0152](./0152-scim-group-grants-only-an-ordinary-permission-set-through-a-per-connection-mapping.md) (2026-11-08, ruling of record `6718345088` on #30959)** — for ordinary permission sets only: a SCIM group grants the set its per-connection `sys_idp_group_mapping` row names, never administrator standing; the text above is unchanged.
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### D7 (open half) — SCIM conformance / smoke coverage runs in this repo's CI
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The half of D7 whose mechanism is open code: **the provisioning surface is exercised by tests that run

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