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feat(spec): declare the optional ISecurityService.describeEffectiveAccess and its EffectiveAccess answer types (#31256)
<!-- claude-projects-attribution: {"github_login":"os-project-manager"} --> _Requested by **Leehom** · [project thread](https://claude.ai/code/project/chan_01TenzsRopZj4jMbvjX8uz1X?thread=cmsg_01TenzsRopZj4jMbvjX8uz1XGML1ZArFc2ffDxPnNbY42U)_ Fixes #31238 Clause-②: yes (widening) Metadata-protocol: none ## 维护者速读 - **改了什么**:只在 spec 的安全服务契约(`security-service.ts`)里新增三个 TypeScript 类型 `EffectivePermissionSetOrigin` / `EffectivePermissionSet` / `EffectiveAccess`,和一个可选成员 `ISecurityService.describeEffectiveAccess?(userId, callerContext?)`:查看某个用户实际生效的权限集,以及每个权限集是怎么来的(默认绑定、所任职位、直接授予,或由解析器派生:配置的平台所有者、AI 席位)。另有契约测试里的类型钉、两份再生成的导出清单和一个 spec patch changeset。 - **为什么改**:用户页的「权限集」标签对靠默认绑定和职位拿到权限的人显示 0(#31215)。服务端席位按路线 A 定:先在 spec 里声明这个回答的形状,再由 #31215 做插件、REST 和客户端。这张卡只是前半段。 - **风险与回滚**:纯类型加法,成员是可选的,现有安全服务实现不改也照样满足契约;没有 schema、可编写键或运行时行为变化。回滚即 revert。名字沿用 `DelegableScope` / `describeDelegableScope` 的先例,您对命名仍有否决窗口。 - **先看**:`packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts` 的 `EffectivePermissionSetOrigin` 与 `describeEffectiveAccess?` 的注释(门禁与「不存在的用户按无权管理拒绝」两句)。 - **两分钟验证**:`pnpm --filter @objectstack/spec exec vitest run src/contracts/security-service.test.ts`,预期 29 个全部通过,其中两条是本卡新增的可选成员与三种形状的类型钉。 - **需要你做的**:无,席位落地(契约复审后)。 ## What changes `packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts`, beside `DelegableScope` / `PositionGrantSummary`, TS interfaces with no Zod (a wire answer, not authorable metadata), text as drafted in #31215's dev report (`pm-orders/server/31215-spec-addition.md`) and re-read on `origin/main` `733efbd4`: 1. `EffectivePermissionSetOrigin`: `{ kind: 'default' } | { kind: 'position'; position: string } | { kind: 'direct' } | { kind: 'derived'; source: 'platform_admin_config' | 'ai_access' }` (the fourth kind added in the fix round, see below). `default` is a binding to the `everyone` audience anchor (deployment baseline, an app's `isDefault` set, an accepted package default; ADR-0090 D5) or the human baseline the resolution adds (`external_default` for an external member); `position` is a held position's definition naming the set (ADR-0131 D3/D4), never `everyone`; `direct` is a `sys_user_permission_set` row of the user's. 2. `EffectivePermissionSet`: `{ name: string; origins: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin[] }`, at least one origin; a set reached two ways is listed once with both. 3. `EffectiveAccess`: `{ userId: string; organizationId: string | null; positions: string[]; permissionSets: EffectivePermissionSet[] }`, the sets in the resolver's own order (defined in the docblock; see the fix round), in the caller's active organization vetted for the described user as `explain` vets it. 4. `ISecurityService.describeEffectiveAccess?(userId: string, callerContext?: SecurityContext): Promise<EffectiveAccess>`, after `describeDelegableScope`, docblock citing ADR-0090 D6/D12: resolved by the resolver enforcement uses; gated as `explain` is (`manage_users`, organization administration of an organization the user is a member of, or a delegated `adminScope` covering the user, the three arms `explainAccessForCaller` in `security-plugin-explain-access.ts` checks today); an unknown user refused exactly as one the caller may not manage (seat decision 6711854159; `explain` itself answers an admitted caller 404 for an unknown id, and #31215 names that difference); OPTIONAL, callers feature-detect and answer "not served" (a REST door answers 501, as the security doors in `packages/rest/src/security-routes.ts` do for an absent member). 5. `packages/spec/api-surface/contracts.json` and `packages/spec/export-origins/contracts.json`: regenerated by `check:generated --fix` (the only two artifacts it proved stale); each gains exactly the three new names. 6. `.changeset/31238-security-service-effective-access.md`: `'@objectstack/spec': patch`. The order named `minor`; AGENTS.md (Post-Task Checklist 3) and `check-changeset-no-major` grade a `Metadata-protocol: none` change `patch` (maintainer ruling A on the level axis), and with this body the gate refuses `minor` (reproduced locally with a `pull_request` event), so the entry is `patch`. No plugin-security, rest, client or core change: those are #31215's, which is serial behind this card and does not close with it. One wording addition to the drafted docblock: the absence paragraph says callers feature-detect and answer "not served", never an empty list, in the words of the `reopenAudienceBindingSuggestion?` precedent. The order's name precedent reads `describeDelegableScope?`; on `main` that member is required (`REQUIRED_MEMBERS` lists it), so the optional-member pins follow the `reopenAudienceBindingSuggestion?` / `checkControlledByParentWrite?` pins instead. ## Tests `packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.test.ts`, two new cases beside the other optional-member pins: - `describeEffectiveAccess is OPTIONAL`: a stub without it satisfies `ISecurityService`; an unguarded call does not compile (`@ts-expect-error`); listing it as a `RequiredMember` does not compile; a stub with it resolves the answer. `REQUIRED_MEMBERS` does not move. - `EffectiveAccess` shapes: the three origins, a `position` origin without its name and an unknown `kind` refused (`@ts-expect-error`), `toEqualTypeOf` on `EffectivePermissionSet`, `EffectiveAccess` and the member's signature, and an exhaustive `switch` with a `never` arm. Reverse check (one-off, not kept): with the member made required, `check:test-typecheck` turns red on this file (4 type errors) and is green again after `git checkout HEAD -- packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts` (blob hash matched HEAD). ## Verification Local gates on the final head `80410d2f`: 82 derived by `dispatch-gates --commands`, 81 exit 0, 1 NOT MEASURED (`check:dual-build-cjs-loads`, exit 3: it needs every package's `dist`, CI's). `--ran` reconciles 82 accounted, 0 unrun. `pnpm --filter @objectstack/spec test`: 821 files / 25966 tests passed (1 todo); `pnpm --filter @objectstack/spec run typecheck` exit 0 (test layer included); `check:generated` green after `--fix`; `check-changeset-no-major` with a `pull_request` event carrying this body exit 0. Details in the card's `os-dev-report`; CI runs the full set. ## Fix round (contract review 6712477832, FAIL → this head) - **M1:** the three kinds could not express sets the resolver confers with no grant row and no position. The union gains `{ kind: 'derived'; source: 'platform_admin_config' | 'ai_access' }`, one docblock per source (`OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL` → `admin_full_access` and platform-admin standing; `sys_user.ai_access` → `ai_seat`), measured over every channel of `resolveUserAuthzGrants` and the plugin's human-baseline join. API-key scopes, an agent's ceiling and the guest anchor are named as not origins (not the user's own resolution). The exhaustive switch covers four kinds and both sources. - **S1:** the gate sentence says an unknown id is refused exactly as an unmanageable one, for every caller, unlike `explain`'s 404 to an admitted caller. - **S2:** `external_default` reports both `{ kind: 'position', position: 'org_external' }` and `{ kind: 'default' }`; `positions` lists the derived `platform_admin` first and `everyone` last, neither ever an origin. - **S3:** the order is the resolver's: grant rows in grant order, position-bound sets in held-position order, derived (`admin_full_access`, then `ai_seat`), then the human baseline; a set already listed keeps its place and gains the later origin. - **Type Check red on `80410d2f`:** plugin-security's `registered-security-service-members.pin.test.ts` lists `describeEffectiveAccess` as `optional` (claim amendment 6712494974 added that one file). - Changeset text refreshed for the derived kind and the order; level unchanged (`patch`). --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01FEkQ5odNVgHTd2MQbQCp5t)_ 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01FEkQ5odNVgHTd2MQbQCp5t <!-- signed: domain:spec#1 · os-project-manager · session_01FEkQ5mw7HFYn9o4LEGMQdK --> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: objectstack-fleet[bot] <332303061+objectstack-fleet[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
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---
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'@objectstack/spec': patch
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---
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feat(spec): declare the optional `ISecurityService.describeEffectiveAccess` and its `EffectiveAccess` answer types
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Clause-②: yes (widening)
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Metadata-protocol: none
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`@objectstack/spec/contracts` gains three exported types and one optional member of the `security` service contract, beside `DelegableScope` / `describeDelegableScope`:
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- `EffectivePermissionSetOrigin`: how a permission set reaches a user, one of `{ kind: 'direct' }` (a `sys_user_permission_set` grant row of the user's), `{ kind: 'position'; position }` (a held position's definition names the set, including a built-in identity position's static binding), `{ kind: 'default' }` (a binding to the `everyone` audience anchor, or the human baseline the resolution adds) and `{ kind: 'derived'; source }` (standing the resolver confers without a grant row or a position, from the closed sources `'platform_admin_config'` and `'ai_access'`).
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- `EffectivePermissionSet`: `{ name, origins }`, at least one origin; a set reached two ways is listed once with both.
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- `EffectiveAccess`: `{ userId, organizationId, positions, permissionSets }`, in the caller's organization; `positions` and `permissionSets` in the resolver's own order, which the contract spells out.
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- `ISecurityService.describeEffectiveAccess?(userId, callerContext?)`: describe a user's effective permission sets and where each comes from, resolved by the resolver enforcement uses, gated as `explain` is (`manage_users`, organization administration of an organization the user belongs to, or a delegated `adminScope` covering the user), with an unknown user refused exactly as one the caller may not manage. Optional: a security service that predates it omits it, and callers feature-detect and answer that the read is not served.
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A TypeScript contract only: no schema, authorable key or runtime answer changes here. The reference implementation and its REST door land separately.

‎packages/plugins/plugin-security/src/registered-security-service-members.pin.test.ts‎

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checkControlledByParentWrite: 'optional',
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explain: 'required',
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describeDelegableScope: 'required',
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describeEffectiveAccess: 'optional',
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listAudienceBindingSuggestions: 'required',
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confirmAudienceBindingSuggestion: 'required',
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dismissAudienceBindingSuggestion: 'required',

‎packages/spec/api-surface/contracts.json‎

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"DeployExecutionResult (interface)",
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"DriverQuery (type)",
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"EMBEDDER_SERVICE (const)",
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"EffectiveAccess (interface)",
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"EffectivePermissionSet (interface)",
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"EffectivePermissionSetOrigin (type)",
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"EmailAddress (type)",
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"EmailAttachment (interface)",
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"EmailDeliveryStatus (type)",

‎packages/spec/export-origins/contracts.json‎

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"DeployExecutionResult": "src/contracts/deploy-pipeline-service.ts#DeployExecutionResult (interface)",
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"DriverQuery": "src/contracts/data-driver.ts#DriverQuery (type)",
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"EMBEDDER_SERVICE": "src/contracts/embedder.ts#EMBEDDER_SERVICE (const)",
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"EffectiveAccess": "src/contracts/security-service.ts#EffectiveAccess (interface)",
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"EffectivePermissionSet": "src/contracts/security-service.ts#EffectivePermissionSet (interface)",
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"EffectivePermissionSetOrigin": "src/contracts/security-service.ts#EffectivePermissionSetOrigin (type)",
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"EmailAddress": "src/contracts/email-service.ts#EmailAddress (type)",
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"EmailAttachment": "src/contracts/email-service.ts#EmailAttachment (interface)",
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"EmailDeliveryStatus": "src/contracts/email-service.ts#EmailDeliveryStatus (type)",

‎packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.test.ts‎

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ControlledByParentWriteOutcome,
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ControlledByParentWriteDenialLeg,
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ControlledByParentWriteUnresolvedReason,
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EffectiveAccess,
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EffectivePermissionSet,
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EffectivePermissionSetOrigin,
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ExplainAccessRequest,
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SecurityContext,
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} from './security-service';
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import type { ExplainRequestSchema } from '../security/explain.zod';
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await expect(gate(missingRow)).resolves.toBe('refuse');
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});
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it('describeEffectiveAccess is OPTIONAL — absence is typed, and it means the read is not served (compile-time)', async () => {
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// A security service that predates the read still satisfies the contract;
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// a caller feature-detects and answers "not served", never an empty list:
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// "no permission sets" is a claim about the user, absence is not.
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const withoutIt: ISecurityService = makeService();
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expect(typeof withoutIt.describeEffectiveAccess).toBe('undefined');
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const mustNotCompileWithoutAGuard = () =>
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// @ts-expect-error possibly undefined — a caller must feature-detect first
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withoutIt.describeEffectiveAccess('u2', { userId: 'u1' });
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expect(typeof mustNotCompileWithoutAGuard).toBe('function');
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// @ts-expect-error `describeEffectiveAccess` is OPTIONAL — not a required member
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const notRequired: RequiredMember = 'describeEffectiveAccess';
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expect(notRequired).toBe('describeEffectiveAccess');
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const answer: EffectiveAccess = {
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userId: 'u2',
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organizationId: 'org_1',
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positions: ['org_member', 'sales_rep', 'everyone'],
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// The resolver's order: grant rows, position-bound sets, derived names, the human baseline.
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// `member_default` is bound to `everyone`, a held position, so it sits in the
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// position-bound slot (origin `default`), before any derived name.
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permissionSets: [
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{ name: 'sales_user', origins: [{ kind: 'direct' }, { kind: 'position', position: 'sales_rep' }] },
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{ name: 'member_default', origins: [{ kind: 'default' }] },
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{ name: 'ai_seat', origins: [{ kind: 'derived', source: 'ai_access' }] },
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],
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};
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const withIt = makeService({ describeEffectiveAccess: async () => answer });
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await expect(withIt.describeEffectiveAccess?.('u2', { userId: 'u1' })).resolves.toEqual(answer);
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});
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it('EffectiveAccess: four closed origins, a position names its position, a derived origin its closed source (compile-time)', () => {
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const everyOrigin: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin[] = [
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{ kind: 'direct' },
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{ kind: 'position', position: 'sales_rep' },
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{ kind: 'default' },
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{ kind: 'derived', source: 'platform_admin_config' },
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{ kind: 'derived', source: 'ai_access' },
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];
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expect(everyOrigin).toHaveLength(5);
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// @ts-expect-error a `position` origin must name the position
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const positionWithoutName: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin = { kind: 'position' };
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// @ts-expect-error the vocabulary is closed: direct, position, default or derived
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const notAnOrigin: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin = { kind: 'inherited' };
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// @ts-expect-error a `derived` origin must name the standing that confers it
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const derivedWithoutSource: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin = { kind: 'derived' };
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// @ts-expect-error the derived sources are closed: the configured platform administrators or `sys_user.ai_access`
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const notASource: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin = { kind: 'derived', source: 'api_key_scope' };
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expect([positionWithoutName, notAnOrigin, derivedWithoutSource, notASource]).toHaveLength(4);
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expectTypeOf<EffectivePermissionSet>().toEqualTypeOf<{
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name: string;
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origins: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin[];
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}>();
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expectTypeOf<EffectiveAccess>().toEqualTypeOf<{
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userId: string;
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organizationId: string | null;
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positions: string[];
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permissionSets: EffectivePermissionSet[];
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}>();
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expectTypeOf<NonNullable<ISecurityService['describeEffectiveAccess']>>().toEqualTypeOf<
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(userId: string, callerContext?: SecurityContext) => Promise<EffectiveAccess>
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>();
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// An exhaustive consumer: a fifth origin kind, or a third derived source,
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// added to the union would stop this switch compiling at a `never` line.
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const sourceLabel = (source: Extract<EffectivePermissionSetOrigin, { kind: 'derived' }>['source']): string => {
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switch (source) {
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case 'platform_admin_config':
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return 'configured platform administrator';
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case 'ai_access':
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return 'AI seat';
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default: {
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const unhandled: never = source;
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return unhandled;
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}
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}
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};
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const label = (o: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin): string => {
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switch (o.kind) {
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case 'direct':
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return 'direct';
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case 'position':
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return `position:${o.position}`;
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case 'default':
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return 'default';
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case 'derived':
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return `derived:${sourceLabel(o.source)}`;
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default: {
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const unhandled: never = o;
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return unhandled;
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}
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}
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};
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expect(everyOrigin.map(label)).toEqual([
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'direct',
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'position:sales_rep',
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'default',
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'derived:configured platform administrator',
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'derived:AI seat',
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]);
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});
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it('reopenAudienceBindingSuggestion is OPTIONAL — absence leaves every dismissal standing (compile-time)', async () => {
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// A security service that predates the re-open door still satisfies the
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// contract; a caller must feature-detect and answer "not served", never

‎packages/spec/src/contracts/security-service.ts‎

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permissionSets: Array<{ name: string; via: PositionGrantVia }>;
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}
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/**
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* How a permission set reaches a user, in {@link EffectivePermissionSet}. One
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* kind per channel through which the resolver enforcement uses
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* (`resolveUserAuthzGrants` in `@objectstack/core`, joined with the security
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* service's human baseline) names a set for a user:
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*
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* - `direct` — one of the user's own `sys_user_permission_set` grant rows
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* names it.
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* - `position` — the definition of a position the user holds names it in
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* `permissionSets` (ADR-0131 D3/D4); `position` is that position's name. A
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* built-in identity position's static binding is such a definition too: an
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* external member's `external_default` is reported with
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* `{ kind: 'position', position: 'org_external' }`. `everyone` is never
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* reported here: its bindings are `default`.
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* - `default` — a default binding: the set is bound to the `everyone`
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* audience anchor (the deployment baseline, an app's `isDefault` set, an
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* accepted package default; ADR-0090 D5), or it is the human baseline the
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* security service adds for every authenticated member (`external_default`
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* for an external member, so that set carries both its `position` and its
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* `default` origin).
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* - `derived` — the resolver confers the name from the user's standing, with
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* no grant row and no position definition naming it. `source` says which
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* standing, and the vocabulary is closed:
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* - `platform_admin_config` — the user's own stored email matches the
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* deployment's configured platform administrators
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* (`OS_PLATFORM_OWNER_EMAIL`), which confers `admin_full_access` and
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* platform-admin standing (on a walled tenancy posture, the only anchor
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* of that standing);
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* - `ai_access` — the user's `sys_user.ai_access` flag is set, which
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* confers the `ai_seat` capability name.
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*
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* Only the user's own resolution is described: the sets an API key's scopes,
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* an agent's ceiling or the anonymous `guest` anchor confer belong to a
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* credential or principal kind, not to the user, and are not origins.
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*/
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export type EffectivePermissionSetOrigin =
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| { kind: 'direct' }
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| { kind: 'position'; position: string }
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| { kind: 'default' }
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| { kind: 'derived'; source: 'platform_admin_config' | 'ai_access' };
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/** One permission set in {@link EffectiveAccess}. */
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export interface EffectivePermissionSet {
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/** The permission set's machine name. */
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name: string;
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/**
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* Every way the set reaches the user, at least one. A set reached two ways
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* is listed once, with both origins (a direct grant and a position, two
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* positions, or a grant row and the configured platform administrator).
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*/
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origins: EffectivePermissionSetOrigin[];
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}
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/** Return shape of {@link ISecurityService.describeEffectiveAccess}. */
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export interface EffectiveAccess {
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/** The user described. */
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userId: string;
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/**
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* The organization the access was resolved in: the caller's active one,
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* vetted for the described user as `explain` vets it. `null` with none.
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*/
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organizationId: string | null;
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/**
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* The positions the user holds there, in force, exactly as the resolver
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* lists them: the derived `platform_admin` first where it is held, then the
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* positions projected from the user's membership (`org_owner`, `org_admin`,
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* `org_member`, `org_external`) and the user's own position rows, then the
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* `everyone` audience anchor for every member who is not external. A position
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* the activation ledger switched off is not listed. `everyone` and
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* `platform_admin` are listed although neither is ever an origin
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* (`everyone`'s bindings are `default`; `platform_admin` names no set).
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*/
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positions: string[];
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/**
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* The permission sets in force for the user there, each once, in the
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* resolver's order: the sets of the user's grant rows in grant order, then
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* the position-bound sets in the order the held positions name them, then
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* the `derived` names (`admin_full_access` from the configured platform
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* administrators, then `ai_seat`), then the human baseline sets the
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* security service adds. A set already listed keeps its first place and
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* gains the later origin.
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*/
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permissionSets: EffectivePermissionSet[];
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}
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/** Selector for {@link ISecurityService.explain}. */
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export interface ExplainAccessRequest {
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/** Object API name to explain access for. */
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*/
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describeDelegableScope(callerContext?: SecurityContext): Promise<DelegableScope>;
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/**
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* [ADR-0090 D6/D12] Describe ANOTHER user's (or the caller's own) effective
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* permission sets, each with where it comes from: a default binding, a held
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* position, or a direct grant. Resolved in the caller's organization by the
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* resolver enforcement uses, so the list matches enforcement by construction.
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*
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* Gated as `explain` is: describing someone else requires `manage_users`,
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* organization administration of an organization that user is a member of,
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* or a delegated `adminScope` covering that user. A user who does not exist
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* is refused exactly as one the caller may not manage, for every caller, so
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* the answer says nothing about which ids exist. This is where it departs
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* from `explain`, which answers an admitted caller `404` for an id with no
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* user row: an implementation sharing explain's gate must not carry that
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* `404` over.
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*
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* **OPTIONAL, and absence is a defined state.** A security service that
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* predates it omits it; callers feature-detect
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* (`typeof svc.describeEffectiveAccess === 'function'`) and answer that the
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* read is not served (a REST door answers 501), never an empty list.
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*/
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describeEffectiveAccess?(userId: string, callerContext?: SecurityContext): Promise<EffectiveAccess>;
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/**
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* List install-time audience-binding suggestions (a package proposes its
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* `isDefault` set for every signed-in member; a `manage_metadata` holder

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