Skip to content

Commit c318490

Browse files
fix(pm): advisory_read holds its sender to target-write, by the maintainer's ruling (#29656)
Fixes #29644 Clause-②: no Metadata-protocol: none ## 维护者速读 - 改了什么:中继的密封公告读取操作(`advisory_read`)现在只要求发送者对目标仓有写、维护或管理权限,与其余中继操作同一道门;不再要求发送者在该公告的协作者名单上。原「协作者」档位整个删除,任何其他取值仍一律拒绝、不封装任何内容。 - 为什么改:按维护者裁决「同意改成对仓库有写权限,立卡派发修复」。旧门槛让首批三次真实读取全部被拒,而有写权限的账号本可自行加为协作者,旧门槛并未挡住任何人。 - 风险与回滚:读取令牌仍只铸「只读」公告权限,未提升;改动只落在中继 `scripts/pm/fleet-write/` 三个文件,不进任何发布包;回滚即还原这一个 commit。 - 先看:`scripts/pm/fleet-write/ops.mjs`(`advisory_read` 行的 `senderGate` 与 `sender` 关卡,风险最高);`execute.mjs`(`advisory_read` 自测电池中的发送者用例);`validate.mjs`(关卡用例)。 - 两分钟验证:`node scripts/pm/fleet-write/execute.mjs --self-test`,预期末行以 `✓ fleet-write/execute self-test: 260 cases pass across 22 batteries` 开头。 - 需要你做的:无,席位落地。 ## What changes - `advisory_read`'s `senderGate` is `'target-write'` (was `'collaborator'`). A read is held to the gate every relay stroke already passes, write, maintain or admin on the target, which the executor judges on the stroke before the advisory's GET. The maintainer's ruling is quoted verbatim in the `ops.mjs` header paragraph and in the row comment, replacing the text that called `collaborator` "the card's recommendation" and said the maintainer would rule on the pull request. - The row's `grant` stays `read`. The row comment says a read refused under it is the maintainer's to rule on, never a raise to write. - **The `collaborator` arm is removed, not kept.** It measured as refusing every live read, it excluded no one (a write sender can add itself to an advisory), and nothing outside these three files names it, so under the startup-stage rule it retires instead of staying a tested but unused setting. `ADVISORY_READ_SENDER_GATES` keeps the one value, and any other value, `collaborator` included, fails closed with nothing sealed. - Follow-on inside the same files: the `sender` fence no longer reads the sender, so `advisoryReadFenceFailures`' context drops `sender` and `advisoryReadAction` no longer takes it. No exported symbol is renamed or removed. - `dispatch.mjs` is unchanged. None of its cases pins the gate: its end-to-end read's sender is on the fixture's collaborators, so it passes under either gate. ## A hypothesis, not a finding These are the readings from the session that led to the ruling (run ids only). The add's PATCH answer listed the sender (run 41545025429). Three reads after it were refused at fence `sender` (runs 41545143476, 41545259848, 41546082963). A re-sent add's pre-PATCH GET under the write grant already listed the sender, so it was a no-op (run 41546190167). **That the read-grant GET answer omits `collaborating_users` is a hypothesis. It is UNVERIFIED.** This PR does not depend on it and does not prove it, and nothing here measured it. The `ops.mjs` header says the same. ## Tests - **Executor (`execute.mjs`), `advisory_read` battery, 17 to 18 cases:** - Rewritten: a sender with write on the target who is not on the advisory's `collaborating_users` is now sealed for, and the parts open byte for byte for the seat's key. Before, this case pinned a refusal. - New: a sender with triage on the target is refused before the advisory's GET, even when the advisory lists it as a collaborator. Exit 4, only the permission read is sent, and there is no row, no seal and no part. - Rewritten: a made-up gate and the retired `collaborator` both fail closed after the GET, even for a write sender the advisory lists. - The marker sweep now covers 20 runs (was 19), with the battery name, the roster pin and the verdict line updated to match. - **Validator (`validate.mjs`), `advisory_read` battery, 28 cases (count unchanged):** - The row pin is now one setting, `target-write`, with the grant `read`. - `target-write` reads no collaborator: someone else listed, none, null or a team alone are all accepted. - Any other gate fails closed: the retired value, misspellings, a prototype key, empty, or absent. - The fence-read case now refuses at `sender` only under an unknown gate. - The leak case now feeds a prose gate value and asserts it is never echoed. ## Acceptance notes - **The card's third acceptance item is the seat's to do after merge:** one live `advisory_read` by a seat with write on the target that opens, recorded on the card as a run id. It is not done here. - `ops.mjs` has no `--self-test` of its own. Run with the flag, it exits 0 and prints nothing, because it is only an import. Its table is pinned by `validate.mjs --self-test`. - **No changeset:** `scripts/pm/` ships in no package, so this PR carries `skip-changeset`. - `origin/main` moved two commits past base `3482f3d8`. Neither touches `scripts/pm/fleet-write/` or its imports, so nothing was merged in. ## Verification All readings below were taken at head `a8eed928`. <details><summary>Relay self-tests, before (base 3482f3d) and after (a8eed92)</summary> ```text before validate EXIT=0 303 cases pass across 16 batteries before execute EXIT=0 259 cases pass across 22 batteries before dispatch EXIT=0 315 cases pass across 27 batteries before ops EXIT=0 (no --self-test handler: zero bytes printed) after validate EXIT=0 303 cases pass across 16 batteries after execute EXIT=0 260 cases pass across 22 batteries after dispatch EXIT=0 315 cases pass across 27 batteries after ops EXIT=0 (no --self-test handler: zero bytes printed) ``` </details> <details><summary>Ablation, one-shot (scripts/ablation-replace.mjs, wrap mode, restore proven)</summary> The expected directions were written down before each leg ran. The fix was committed first, so each restore leg points at HEAD. ```text Leg A: ops.mjs senderGate 'target-write' replaced by 'collaborator' (the pre-change value, now unknown) anchor x1 to x0, replacement x0 to x1, blob 8bd15e5 to 46d1f81abb0a validate EXIT=1 1 of 303 failed (the row pin) execute EXIT=1 8 of 260 failed (the landed read, its opening and parts, the long read, the write-sender-off-collaborators case) dispatch EXIT=1 4 of 315 failed (the end-to-end read and its follow-ons) restored: blob == HEAD (8bd15e5), git diff HEAD empty Leg B: ops.mjs sender fence made to pass always (fail open) anchor x1 to x0, replacement x0 to x1, blob 8bd15e5 to 8e4242593a79 validate EXIT=1 3 of 303 failed (any other gate closed; fence read under an unknown gate; the prose-gate leak case) execute EXIT=1 1 of 260 failed (an unknown and the retired gate fail closed) dispatch EXIT=0 315 pass (as predicted: it pins no unknown gate) restored: blob == HEAD (8bd15e5), git diff HEAD empty, git status clean ``` </details> <details><summary>Gates: dispatch-gates --commands --repo objectstack-ai/objectstack (39 families, all run at a8eed92)</summary> Every exit code was captured before any pipe, and each log's own verdict line was read. `pnpm check:pm-dispatch-gates` ran under nohup: its fast tier passed 1945 cases in 403.2s. ```text 0 node scripts/check-closing-keyword-parity.mjs 0 pnpm check:entry-guard 0 node scripts/check-closing-keyword-parity.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:gitlink-declared 0 node scripts/check-comment-mask-corpus.mjs 0 pnpm check:nul-bytes 0 node scripts/check-declaration-mirrors.mjs 0 pnpm check:parse-guard 0 node scripts/check-declaration-mirrors.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:pm-close-cards 0 node scripts/check-self-test-wired.mjs 0 pnpm check:pm-dispatch-gates 0 node scripts/check-self-test-wired.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:pm-fleet-write-dispatch 0 node scripts/check-self-test-workflow-commands.mjs 0 pnpm check:pm-fleet-write-execute 0 node scripts/check-self-test-workflow-commands.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:pm-fleet-write-validate 0 node scripts/check-whole-set-label-write.mjs 0 pnpm check:pm-issue-create 0 node scripts/check-whole-set-label-write.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:pm-issue-transfer 0 node scripts/ci/plan-test-core-shards.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:pm-label-write 0 node scripts/pm/bare-root-worklist.mjs --self-test 0 pnpm check:pm-post-stamped 0 pnpm check:agent-test-spelling 0 pnpm check:pm-record-recognisers 0 pnpm check:bash32-floor 0 pnpm check:pm-write-pace 0 pnpm check:ci-filter-parity 0 pnpm check:pnpm-filter-targets 0 pnpm check:cli-command-ids 0 pnpm check:pnpm-flag-spellings 0 pnpm check:cross-package-test-inputs 0 pnpm check:refd-timer-probe 0 pnpm check:driver-memory-census 0 pnpm check:scripts-symbol-anchors 0 pnpm check:watch-hint-literal --ran reconciliation: ✓ dispatch-gates --ran: 39 derived famil(ies) accounted for — 39 run, 0 NOT-MEASURED (a DERIVED zero — all 39 recorded an exit code and none of them is 3). ``` These run in CI and not locally: the 52 artifact-roster families, the 11 wide-population families, the type-check lanes and the planned Test Core shard step. This diff touches no TypeScript package. </details> --- _Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code/session_01QSeKYn5CmmdShCJifm6WYj)_ Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 parent cee250b commit c318490

3 files changed

Lines changed: 61 additions & 58 deletions

File tree

‎scripts/pm/fleet-write/execute.mjs‎

Lines changed: 20 additions & 17 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -259,9 +259,9 @@
259259
* FAILED action with `ADVISORY_READ_UNREACHED` and the row status
260260
* `not reached` — no HTTP status, no grant remedy, ⛔ never the exception's
261261
* message. On an answer, the executor judges `ADVISORY_READ_FENCES` on it — a 200 advisory, the
262-
* one the action names, and a sender the row's `senderGate` admits (the
263-
* default, `collaborator`: the sender on the advisory's own
264-
* `collaborating_users`; `ops.mjs` records the ruling the maintainer owes) —
262+
* one the action names, and a row whose `senderGate` the table knows
263+
* (`target-write`, by the maintainer's ruling `ops.mjs` records: the sender
264+
* gate this stroke already passed before the GET; any other value closed) —
265265
* and on any failure seals nothing and emits nothing: a FAILED action, exit 5,
266266
* whose row names the fences and the status alone. Otherwise it seals
267267
* `ADVISORY_READ_FIELDS` of the answer to the action's `public_key`
@@ -1026,15 +1026,15 @@ export function confirmAdvisory(req, answer, pre) {
10261026
* the row's text; `why` the failure's. ⛔ No string it returns carries the id, the state or any field of the answer:
10271027
* the fences speak through `advisoryReadFenceText`, a refusal's message through `advisoryPlatformText`, a failed seal
10281028
* through `ADVISORY_READ_SEAL_FAILED` — never the exception. `seal` and `senderGate` are the self-test's doors (a seal
1029-
* that throws, the other gate); the CLI passes neither. Never throws.
1029+
* that throws, a gate the table does not know); the CLI passes neither. Never throws.
10301030
*/
1031-
export async function advisoryReadAction(req, { payload, index, sender, api, t, seal = sealAdvisoryRead, senderGate = OPS.advisory_read.senderGate }) {
1031+
export async function advisoryReadAction(req, { payload, index, api, t, seal = sealAdvisoryRead, senderGate = OPS.advisory_read.senderGate }) {
10321032
const { ghsaId, publicKey } = req.advisoryRead;
10331033
const r = await rest(api, req.path, { method: 'GET' }, t);
10341034
// Status 0 is `rest`'s word for a call that threw before any answer: the platform judged nothing, so the row names no
10351035
// HTTP status and no grant remedy — and ⛔ never the exception's message, which can carry the path and so the id.
10361036
if (r.status === 0) return { ok: false, status: ADVISORY_READ_UNREACHED_STATUS, why: ADVISORY_READ_UNREACHED, notes: [] };
1037-
const failures = advisoryReadFenceFailures({ ghsaId, answer: r, sender, gate: senderGate });
1037+
const failures = advisoryReadFenceFailures({ ghsaId, answer: r, gate: senderGate });
10381038
if (failures.length) {
10391039
const refused = !(r.status >= 200 && r.status < 300);
10401040
const why = `REFUSED at the relay's fence on the advisory the action names, nothing sealed or emitted — ${advisoryReadFenceText(failures)}${refused ? `${advisoryPlatformText(r.detail)}; ${ADVISORY_READ_ACCESS_REMEDY}` : ''}`;
@@ -1428,7 +1428,7 @@ export async function executeFleetWrite({ payload: raw, sender, token, api = DEF
14281428
// of it printed, the id included: its row's call is the path with the id left out.
14291429
if (req.advisoryRead) {
14301430
const call = advisoryReadCall(payload.repo);
1431-
const read = await advisoryReadAction(req, { payload, index: i + 1, sender, api, t, ...(deps.advisoryRead ?? {}) });
1431+
const read = await advisoryReadAction(req, { payload, index: i + 1, api, t, ...(deps.advisoryRead ?? {}) });
14321432
rows.push({ action: i + 1, op: action.op, call, status: read.status, result: read.ok ? scrub(read.result, [token]) : `FAILED: ${scrub(read.why, [token])}` });
14331433
if (!read.ok) {
14341434
stoppedAt = { action: i + 1, op: action.op, why: scrub(read.why, [token]) };
@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ const SELF_TEST_BATTERIES = Object.freeze({
15621562
"the run_rerun_failed: the five fences judged HERE on the run and its pull, read immediately before ONE bodiless POST — the pull's current head by its own GET, never the run's embedded copy, and a run naming no pull refused by name; each refused with the POST not sent and accepted on the measured run; a run, pull, baseline or fence that fails is zero writes; the 201 confirmed only by reading attempt 2 back with its failed jobs queued or in progress, naming their job ids; attempt 2 never seen, a failed job completed, or a job list unread is FAILED; no annotation": 21,
15631563
"the hierarchy link: sub_issue_add and sub_issue_remove read the parent's and the child's own answers, then the child's parent (add) or the parent's whole list (remove), immediately before ONE write whose body is the child's REST id from its own answer — never its number, never replace_parent; a pull, a transferred or unread card, a child under another parent, one the parent does not list, or a read that is neither answer is zero writes; a child already under this parent is a no-op landed on the list; the answer confirmed only when the parent's list reads the child back (or no longer does) inside the window; a refused write, a list that never settles or never reads whole is FAILED; no annotation, and the rows ride a stroke beside other ops": 20,
15641564
"the advisory rows: advisory_report and advisory_create are ONE POST of their body each, landed on a 2xx carrying an id — a draft's reading state draft — that the row and a notice annotation name; advisory_collaborators_add and advisory_state read the advisory first and send ONE PATCH whose body is the executor's — every existing login kept with the missing ones added, an all-present list a no-op, or the one state a legal transition reaches — or nothing at all on a fence: an unread, other or wrong-state advisory or an illegal move; each lands only when its answer shows the result; ⛔ the marker in a report's or a draft's summary, description and packages and in every advisory answer's summary, description and vulnerabilities reaches no log line, row, step summary or annotation": 32,
1565-
"advisory_read: ONE GET after the sender gate and nothing written; the read, advisory and sender fences judged on that answer — collaborator by default, target-write by switch, an unknown gate closed — then the answer sealed to the seat's key and emitted as notice parts the reader parses back, opening byte for byte for that key and read alone; a failed or unsealed seal and an over-cap answer FAILED with nothing emitted; ⛔ the marker in the summary, description and vulnerabilities, and the advisory's id, reach no log line, row, step summary or annotation, and the sealed answer alone carries no marker": 17,
1565+
"advisory_read: ONE GET after the sender gate and nothing written; the read, advisory and sender fences judged on that answer — target-write by the maintainer's ruling, a sender off the advisory's collaborators sealed for, one without write refused before the GET, any other gate closed — then the answer sealed to the seat's key and emitted as notice parts the reader parses back, opening byte for byte for that key and read alone; a failed or unsealed seal and an over-cap answer FAILED with nothing emitted; ⛔ the marker in the summary, description and vulnerabilities, and the advisory's id, reach no log line, row, step summary or annotation, and the sealed answer alone carries no marker": 18,
15661566
});
15671567
// Raised 17 → 18 with the governed-review follow-up battery, 18 → 19 with the run_rerun_failed battery, 19 → 20 with the
15681568
// hierarchy link battery, 20 → 21 with the advisory rows' battery, 21 → 22 with advisory_read's: one battery, one row.
@@ -2600,7 +2600,7 @@ export async function selfTest() {
26002600
}
26012601

26022602
// ── advisory_read ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
2603-
battery("advisory_read: ONE GET after the sender gate and nothing written; the read, advisory and sender fences judged on that answer — collaborator by default, target-write by switch, an unknown gate closed — then the answer sealed to the seat's key and emitted as notice parts the reader parses back, opening byte for byte for that key and read alone; a failed or unsealed seal and an over-cap answer FAILED with nothing emitted; ⛔ the marker in the summary, description and vulnerabilities, and the advisory's id, reach no log line, row, step summary or annotation, and the sealed answer alone carries no marker");
2603+
battery("advisory_read: ONE GET after the sender gate and nothing written; the read, advisory and sender fences judged on that answer — target-write by the maintainer's ruling, a sender off the advisory's collaborators sealed for, one without write refused before the GET, any other gate closed — then the answer sealed to the seat's key and emitted as notice parts the reader parses back, opening byte for byte for that key and read alone; a failed or unsealed seal and an over-cap answer FAILED with nothing emitted; ⛔ the marker in the summary, description and vulnerabilities, and the advisory's id, reach no log line, row, step summary or annotation, and the sealed answer alone carries no marker");
26042604
{
26052605
const { generateKeyPairSync } = await import('node:crypto');
26062606
// Made-up ids: the fixture names no real advisory.
@@ -2618,7 +2618,7 @@ export async function selfTest() {
26182618
const SEAT = pair();
26192619
const read = (extra = {}) => ({ op: 'advisory_read', ghsa_id: GHSA, public_key: SEAT.spki, ...extra });
26202620
// An advisory answer carrying the marker in its summary, description and vulnerabilities and in every other field
2621-
// but its id and its state — the sender on its collaborators, so the default gate admits the read.
2621+
// but its id and its state — the default sender on its collaborators, which the gate (target-write) never reads.
26222622
const advisory = (extra = {}, status = 200) => ({
26232623
status,
26242624
json: {
@@ -2672,14 +2672,17 @@ export async function selfTest() {
26722672
const long = advisory({ description: `${MARKER} ${'the long description, line by line.\n'.repeat(600)}` });
26732673
const many = await readRun([read()], { ...allowed, [A_GET]: long });
26742674
t('a long answer is cut into its parts, in order, each part numbered k/n with one n, every message inside the cut, and still opens byte for byte', [many.exit, many.annotations.length > 1, many.annotations.map((n) => `${n.part}/${n.of}`).join(' ') === many.annotations.map((_, k) => `${k + 1}/${many.annotations.length}`).join(' '), notices(many).every((l) => l.length - l.indexOf('::', 2) - 2 <= 4096), opens(many) === picked(long.json)], [EXIT_OK, true, true, true, true]);
2675-
// ⛔ The sender gate.
2675+
// ⚖ The sender gate: target-write, by the maintainer's ruling — judged on the stroke before the GET, nothing more after it.
26762676
const PERM_B = `GET /repos/${REPO}/collaborators/os-dev-b/permission`;
26772677
const writerB = { [PERM_B]: { status: 200, json: { permission: 'write', role_name: 'write', user: { login: 'os-dev-b' } } } };
2678-
const stranger = await readRun([read()], { ...writerB, [A_GET]: advisory() }, { sender: 'os-dev-b' });
2679-
t('⛔ the default gate is collaborator: a sender with write on the target who is NOT on the advisory\'s collaborating_users is refused after the ONE GET — nothing sealed, no part, exit 5, the row naming the sender fence', [stranger.exit, stranger.seen.map((s) => s.call), stranger.annotations.length, notices(stranger).length, stranger.rows[0]?.status, stranger.rows[0]?.result], [EXIT_ACTION_FAILED, [PERM_B, A_GET], 0, 0, 200, "FAILED: REFUSED at the relay's fence on the advisory the action names, nothing sealed or emitted — fence `sender`: os-dev-b is not a collaborator on it, and the relay seals only for a sender the advisory's own collaborating_users lists"]);
2680-
const switched = await readRun([read()], { ...writerB, [A_GET]: advisory() }, { sender: 'os-dev-b', advisoryRead: { senderGate: 'target-write' } });
2678+
const outsider = await readRun([read()], { ...writerB, [A_GET]: advisory() }, { sender: 'os-dev-b' });
2679+
t("⚖ the gate is target-write, by the maintainer's ruling: a sender with write on the target who is NOT on the advisory's collaborating_users is sealed for — the ONE GET after the sender gate, exit 0, and the parts open byte for byte for the seat's key", [OPS.advisory_read.senderGate, advisory().json.collaborating_users.some((u) => u.login.toLowerCase() === 'os-dev-b'), outsider.exit, outsider.seen.map((s) => s.call), outsider.annotations.length > 0, outsider.rows[0]?.status, opens(outsider) === picked(advisory().json)], ['target-write', false, EXIT_OK, [PERM_B, A_GET], true, 200, true]);
2680+
const triageB = { [PERM_B]: { status: 200, json: { permission: 'read', role_name: 'triage', user: { login: 'os-dev-b' } } } };
2681+
const reader = await readRun([read()], { ...triageB, [A_GET]: advisory({ collaborating_users: [{ login: 'os-dev-b' }] }) }, { sender: 'os-dev-b' });
2682+
t("⛔ …so the stroke's gate is the read's whole gate: a sender with triage on the target is refused BEFORE the advisory's GET, even one the advisory lists as a collaborator — exit 4, the permission read alone, no row, nothing sealed, no part", [reader.exit, reader.seen.map((s) => s.call), reader.rows.length, (reader.annotations ?? []).length, notices(reader).length], [EXIT_SENDER_REFUSED, [PERM_B], 0, 0, 0]);
26812683
const unknown = await readRun([read()], { ...allowed, [A_GET]: advisory() }, { advisoryRead: { senderGate: 'anyone' } });
2682-
t('⚖ switched to target-write — the other setting the maintainer may rule for — the same sender is sealed for; an unknown setting fails CLOSED, refusing even a collaborator', [switched.exit, switched.annotations.length > 0, unknown.exit, unknown.annotations.length, unknown.rows[0]?.result.includes('fence `sender`: the row names no sender gate the table knows')], [EXIT_OK, true, EXIT_ACTION_FAILED, 0, true]);
2684+
const retired = await readRun([read()], { ...allowed, [A_GET]: advisory() }, { advisoryRead: { senderGate: 'collaborator' } });
2685+
t('⛔ any other setting fails CLOSED after the GET, a made-up one and the retired collaborator alike, refusing even a sender with write whom the advisory lists — exit 5, nothing sealed, no part, the row naming the sender fence', [unknown, retired].map((r) => [r.exit, r.annotations.length, notices(r).length, r.rows[0]?.result.includes('fence `sender`: the row names no sender gate the table knows')]), [unknown, retired].map(() => [EXIT_ACTION_FAILED, 0, 0, true]));
26832686
// ⛔ The read and advisory fences.
26842687
const forbidden = await readRun([read()], { ...allowed, [A_GET]: { status: 403, json: { message: 'Resource not accessible by integration', documentation_url: MARKER } } });
26852688
const missing = await readRun([read()], { ...allowed, [A_GET]: { status: 404, json: { message: MARKER } } });
@@ -2706,7 +2709,7 @@ export async function selfTest() {
27062709
// ⛔ The sweep: every run above, every channel this file emits on — no marker, and no advisory id.
27072710
const emitted = swept.map(({ r, paceLines }) => [...(r.logs ?? []), ...(r.lines ?? []), r.summary ?? '', JSON.stringify(r.rows ?? []), ...(r.annotations ?? []).map((n) => relayAdvisoryReadAnnotationMessage(n)), ...paceLines].join('\n'));
27082711
const leaks = emitted.map((text, i) => (text.includes('ADVISORY MARKER') ? i : null)).filter((i) => i !== null);
2709-
t('⛔ THE MARKER TEST: across every run of this battery — landed, long, refused at the sender, read and advisory fences, the switched and unknown gates, a GET that never reached the platform, a seal that throws, one that does not seal, one too large, refused payloads — the marker served in the summary, the description and the vulnerabilities (and every other field) reaches NO log line, row, step summary, annotation or pace-log line', [swept.length, leaks], [19, []], leaks.map((i) => emitted[i].split('\n').find((l) => l.includes('ADVISORY MARKER'))).join(' | '));
2712+
t('⛔ THE MARKER TEST: across every run of this battery — landed, long, a sender outside the collaborators, one refused at the stroke\'s sender gate, the unknown and retired gates, read and advisory fences, a GET that never reached the platform, a seal that throws, one that does not seal, one too large, refused payloads — the marker served in the summary, the description and the vulnerabilities (and every other field) reaches NO log line, row, step summary, annotation or pace-log line', [swept.length, leaks], [20, []], leaks.map((i) => emitted[i].split('\n').find((l) => l.includes('ADVISORY MARKER'))).join(' | '));
27102713
const named = emitted.map((text, i) => ([GHSA, OTHER].some((id) => text.includes(id)) ? i : null)).filter((i) => i !== null);
27112714
t("⛔ …and NO advisory id: neither the one asked for nor the one answered appears on any line, row, summary or annotation of any run — the call's placeholder stands where every other row prints its path", named, [], named.map((i) => emitted[i].split('\n').find((l) => l.includes(GHSA) || l.includes(OTHER))).join(' | '));
27122715
t('…positive control: every answer served carried the marker and the id, the request carried the id to the platform — where it belongs — and the generic row printer, given the same answer, WOULD print both', [swept.every(({ answers }) => JSON.stringify(answers).includes('ADVISORY MARKER') && JSON.stringify(answers).includes(GHSA)), landed.seen.some((s) => s.call === A_GET), resultOf({}, served.json).includes('ADVISORY MARKER') && resultOf({}, served.json).includes(GHSA)], [true, true, true]);
@@ -2807,7 +2810,7 @@ export async function selfTest() {
28072810
"an issue-hierarchy link fenced on its two cards, sent as the child's REST id and landing only when the parent's list reads it back, " +
28082811
"the payload read from the event file, four advisory rows — a report landed on the id it was given, a draft on its id reading state draft, collaborators and a state fenced on the advisory's own read and landed on the PATCH answer — " +
28092812
'whose marker in a summary, a description and a vulnerability reached no log line, row, summary or annotation, ' +
2810-
"an advisory read fenced on its GET — the sender a collaborator by default — and sealed to the seat's one-time key, its notice parts opening byte for byte " +
2813+
"an advisory read fenced on its GET — its sender held to write on the target, by the maintainer's ruling — and sealed to the seat's one-time key, its notice parts opening byte for byte " +
28112814
'for that key and read alone, no part on a failed seal, the marker and the id on no public surface and the marker not in the sealed answer, one summary row per request, ' +
28122815
"one annotation per created or moved card carrying the number the platform answered, read back by the reader's own parser, a stroke at or " +
28132816
'above the batch threshold announced as ONE rule ⑤ batch and paced at the batch gap (one the job cannot hold refused with zero requests), and a known ' +

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)