[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
body-parser	1.20.8 → 1.20.9
serialize-javascript	7.1.2 → 7.1.3

---

body-parser vulnerable to Denial of Service via trailing bytes after a compressed request body

CVE-2026-111181 / GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828

More information

Details

Impact

A single request can crash any application using body-parser with default options. When a request carries a Content-Encoding (for example gzip), body-parser pipes it into a decompression stream and, after reading the body, leaves that stream piped with no error listener. A payload of one valid compressed frame followed by trailing bytes decodes and the application responds normally, but the trailing bytes then reach the already-finished decoder, which emits an error that is re-thrown as an uncaught exception and terminates the process. No authentication or matching route is required, since parsing runs before routing.

Patches

Fixed in body-parser 2.4.0 and 1.20.9. Upgrade to one of these versions.

Workarounds

Pass inflate: false to the body-parser middleware if the application does not need to accept compressed request bodies. This rejects encoded requests before any decompression stream is created.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/expressjs/body-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111181
• https://github.com/expressjs/body-parser/commit/1260c3845f54502a05a87594f09a334786bb34d7
• https://github.com/expressjs/body-parser/commit/f7075eae3a84c3473ab4bf0a777da28db208e916
• https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html
• https://github.com/expressjs/body-parser/releases/tag/1.20.9
• https://github.com/expressjs/body-parser/releases/tag/v2.4.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Serialize JavaScript: Cross-site scripting (XSS) via unescaped </script at the end of a serialized function body

CVE-2026-115897 / GHSA-m5mm-p8h7-m29v

More information

Details

Impact

serialize-javascript escapes its output so it is safe to embed inside a
<script> element. Before 7.1.3 that guarantee did not hold for a function
value whose source ends in a bare </script.

Each function body is escaped on its own, and a bare </script was only
neutralized when followed — within the same body — by a character the HTML
tokenizer treats as ending the tag name (TAB, LF, FF, CR, SPACE, / or >).
A body ending exactly at </script has no following character, so it was
emitted unescaped. The delimiter is then supplied by the surrounding output
(for example the newline the space option emits after the value), and a
later serialized value can supply the closing > followed by markup:

const serialize = require('serialize-javascript');
function f() {} f.toString = () => 'function f(){ return 1 }//</script';
function g() {} g.toString = () => 'function g(x){ return x } > <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>';
serialize({ a: { f }, g }, { space: 2 });
// {
//   "a": {
//     "f": function f(){ return 1 }//</script
//   },
//   "g": function g(x){ return x } > <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
// }

Embedded in a <script> element, the script ends at the injected tag and the
<img> becomes a live element in the page.

Exploitation requires an attacker to control the source text of a
serialized function, in practice through a spoofed toString(). Real
functions always end in }, so ordinary function values are not affected,
and non-function values (including strings containing </script) are
escaped correctly.

Patches

Fixed in 7.1.3 (#​235). The bare </script form is now also matched at
the end of the function body, so it is escaped regardless of what follows it
in the output.

Workarounds

Upgrade to 7.1.3. If you cannot upgrade, do not serialize function values
whose source text (or toString()) can be influenced by an attacker.

Credits

Reported by ha_kr25 via the Yahoo bug bounty program.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.1 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/security/advisories/GHSA-m5mm-p8h7-m29v
• https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/pull/235
• https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/commit/2864b3c6260a3bfd52d2db3e70d1a079de108a61
• https://github.com/yahoo/serialize-javascript/releases/tag/v7.1.3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m5mm-p8h7-m29v

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

expressjs/body-parser (body-parser)

v1.20.9

Compare Source

Important: Security

• Security fix for CVE-2026-111181 (GHSA-27r3-jxmh-p828)

What's Changed

• Release: 1.20.9 by @​UlisesGascon in #​779

Full Changelog: expressjs/body-parser@1.20.8...1.20.9

yahoo/serialize-javascript (serialize-javascript)

v7.1.3

Compare Source

See: GHSA-m5mm-p8h7-m29v

What's Changed

• fix: escape </script at the end of a serialized function body by @​redonkulus in #​235
• Fix serialization of Dates with expanded ISO years by @​Shubham-Padkonde in #​232
• fix: ignore functions without mutating input objects by @​Shubham-Padkonde in #​233
• release: v7.1.3 by @​redonkulus in #​236

Note on ignoreFunction

With ignoreFunction: true, function values are now omitted the same way JSON.stringify omits them, without deleting them from the input object. Functions inside arrays are emitted as null (previously this produced Array.prototype.slice.call(...) output).

New Contributors

• @​Shubham-Padkonde made their first contribution in #​232

Full Changelog: yahoo/serialize-javascript@v7.1.2...v7.1.3

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