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Security Policy

Audit status

These contracts have not been professionally audited.

This is a testnet project. Do not deploy it to a mainnet, and do not put funds of real value into it, without an independent audit first.

Reporting a vulnerability

Open a security advisory rather than a public issue, and give me a reasonable window to respond before disclosing.

Useful reports include the affected contract or module, the conditions needed to trigger the issue, and what an attacker gains.

Trust model

Understanding what the system does and does not guarantee is most of the security story here.

On-chain — authoritative

Ownership, balances, crops, land, items and trades are settled by contracts. Nothing off-chain can create, move or destroy them.

Off-chain — no authority over assets

The multiplayer service carries player positions and chat. It holds no private keys, signs nothing, and cannot mint, transfer or spend anything. A full compromise of that server would let an attacker disrupt presence and chat; it would not let them take a single token.

Privileged roles

The contract owner can:

  • pause GameManager and Marketplace
  • retune economy parameters within hard-coded bounds
  • publish or retire seeds and recipes
  • grant and revoke minter/operator rights
  • withdraw accumulated marketplace fees and land-sale proceeds

The contract owner cannot:

  • mint FGOLD directly — FarmToken restricts minting to registered minter contracts, and the owner is deliberately excluded
  • seize an NFT held in marketplace escrow — rescueNFT reverts on any token backing an active listing
  • swap the token, NFT, land or settlement contracts — those references are immutable
  • raise the harvest bonus without limit — capped at MAX_HARVEST_BONUS_BPS

Ownable2Step is used throughout, so ownership can be moved to a multisig without risk of a mistyped address bricking administration.

Known risks

Risk Status
No professional audit Open. The single largest caveat.
Starter-pack faucet is sybil-farmable Accepted for testnet. One free claim per address. Disable via setStarterPackConfig before any mainnet deployment.
Plot fertility uses blockhash pseudo-randomness Accepted. Miner-influenceable inside a 50–100 band, worth at most a 10% yield swing — below the cost of manipulating it. Documented in FarmLand.
Growth windows depend on block.timestamp Accepted. Windows are minutes to hours; a validator can shift a block by seconds, which cannot meaningfully accelerate a crop. Covered by a test.
Owner key compromise Open. Would allow pausing and economy retuning within bounds. Use a multisig for anything beyond a testnet.
Public RPC endpoints Operational. Rate limits can degrade the client. Set NEXT_PUBLIC_RPC_URL to a dedicated endpoint.

Defences in place

  • Re-entrancy — ReentrancyGuard on every state-changing entry point, and checks-effects-interactions ordering throughout. Harvest clears farm state before minting the crop NFT, so an ERC-721 receiver hook cannot observe a still-harvestable plot. Two attacker contracts in contracts/test/ attempt exactly this and are asserted to fail.
  • Marketplace front-running — buyItem takes a maxPrice bound, and a price increase only takes effect from the following block, so a seller cannot reprice into a pending purchase.
  • Burn authorisation — gameBurn requires the caller to name the token's expected owner, so a mis-ordered game action cannot destroy a bystander's item.
  • Allowance-based spending — the game burns FGOLD via burnFrom, which needs the player's approval, rather than holding unilateral burn rights.
  • Wallet identity off-chain — the multiplayer server verifies a signature over a single-use, server-issued nonce before accepting an address. The nonce is consumed whether or not verification succeeds, so signatures cannot be replayed.
  • Input validation — every socket payload is validated at runtime; non-finite coordinates, malformed addresses and oversized messages are rejected rather than propagated.
  • Rate limiting — token buckets on movement, chat and authentication, plus a per-IP HTTP limit.

Secret handling

No private key, mnemonic or API key belongs in this repository. .env files are gitignored, .env.example files carry placeholders only, and CI fails the build if a .env file or a 32-byte hex literal appears outside tests.

The deployer key configured in .env becomes the contracts' owner. Use a throwaway account holding nothing but testnet ETH.