feat(methodologies): integrate task, error, interaction, and variability analysis

Author: Codex

docs/adr/0005-integrate-task-error-interaction-variability-methods.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# ADR 0005: Integrate task, error, interaction, and variability analysis
+
+- **Date:** 2026-09-12
+- **Status:** accepted
+
+## Context
+
+Task and cognitive analysis appeared as generic catalog entries. Users needed actionable selection boundaries and procedures for HTA and CTA, followed by credible task-error analysis, practiced interaction-time comparison, and analysis of everyday sociotechnical variability.
+
+## Decision
+
+Keep HTA, CTA, and SHERPA in human factors (`35`), GOMS/KLM in interaction design (`20`), and FRAM in safety and systems (`06`). Add canonical cards with prerequisites, procedures, outputs, sources, and evidence limits. Route training and UX task-analysis uses to the human-factors owner. Record ownership in the taxonomy and expose optional compositions without requiring every method.
+
+HTA supplies goals, operations, and execution plans; CTA elicits cognitive demands and expert cues. SHERPA identifies credible task errors and recovery. KLM estimates execution time for a specified practiced, error-free method. FRAM distinguishes a potential-coupling model from scenario/event instantiations. No model or worksheet alone establishes achieved performance, calibrated error probabilities, causal proof, or safety.
+
+## Alternatives and consequences
+
+Separate domain-specific copies or new skills would duplicate definitions and weaken routing. A generic task-analysis entry would leave these different outputs and assumptions hidden. The selected owners preserve one definition per method while allowing downstream tailoring.
+
+Source consultation is recorded in the [registry](../../skills/select-methodologies/references/11-source-registry.md). Where original full protocols were unavailable, the cards state that limitation. Exact protocol replication and effectiveness claims require further evidence.
+
+Repository validation checks structure and links. The [selection scenarios](../../tests/scenarios/selection-invariants.md) define future behavioral evaluation expectations; they are not reported as executed model benchmarks.

skills/select-methodologies/SKILL.md

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Read only the files needed:
 | Process discovery/design, adaptive flow, operations, service management, quality, or continuous improvement | `references/03-process-operations-quality.md` |
 | Software lifecycle, architecture, APIs, distributed systems, or delivery | `references/04-software-systems-architecture.md` |
 | Requirements, planning, formal specification, contracts, or state reasoning | `references/05-requirements-formal-planning.md` |
-| Verification, testing, reliability, safety, security, or assurance | `references/06-testing-reliability-safety-security.md` |
+| Verification, testing, reliability, safety, FRAM, sociotechnical performance variability, security, or assurance | `references/06-testing-reliability-safety-security.md` |
 | Data/information governance, metadata, semantics, knowledge management, data quality, lineage, or provenance | `references/07-data-information-knowledge.md` |
 | Decision analysis, optimization, uncertainty, or causal inference | `references/08-decision-optimization-causality.md` |
 | Probability, statistics, sampling, estimation, prediction, or statistical inference | `references/37-probability-statistics-inference.md` |
@@ -102,14 +102,18 @@ Read only the files needed:
 | Crisis leadership, organizational resilience, business continuity, BIA, incident/emergency management, disaster recovery, exercises, or recovery | `references/32-crisis-continuity-emergency-management.md` |
 | GIS, spatial-data quality, geocoding, spatial statistics/econometrics, remote sensing, service areas, suitability, or location decisions | `references/33-geospatial-location-analysis.md` |
 | Asset management, criticality, maintenance strategy, RCM, RBI, condition monitoring, spares, obsolescence, or lifecycle renewal | `references/34-asset-maintenance-reliability.md` |
-| Human factors, ergonomics, human-systems integration, workload, medical devices, clinical evidence, usability engineering, or medical QMS | `references/35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md` |
+| Human factors, ergonomics, task/subgoal analysis, HTA, CTA, expert decisions/cues, human-systems integration, workload, medical devices, clinical evidence, usability engineering, or medical QMS | `references/35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md` |
 | Construction, infrastructure, BIM, ISO 19650, constructability, Last Planner, commissioning, or built-asset handover | `references/36-construction-infrastructure-bim.md` |
 | Urban, territorial, regional, land-use, mobility, public-space, or place-based planning | `references/38-urban-territorial-planning.md` |
 
 For a cross-domain problem, begin with the primary decision catalog and at most two adjacent domain catalogs. Add another only when a selected fragment is canonically owned there or a material hard gate remains uncovered. Route by decision and missing capability, not by every noun in the prompt. `references/10-composition-patterns.md` and `references/11-source-registry.md` do not count as domain catalogs. Do not load all references by default.
 
 When a prompt says only “uncertainty,” identify the required output before routing: probability/statistical inference, decision choice, optimization, causal effect, forecast, risk treatment, or evidence confidence. Route statistical/probabilistic inference to `37`; route choices, optimization, causal identification, and decision robustness to `08`. Use both only when the statistical result is an input to a distinct decision or causal design.
 
+For task analysis, route goal/subgoal decomposition and execution plans to Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA); route expert cues, judgments, strategies, and cognitive demands to Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA). Both are owned by `35`; use training (`18`) or UX (`20`) only for a distinct downstream design decision. Clarify ambiguous `HTA`: Health Technology Assessment is a different method in the same catalog. HTA is not Hierarchical Task Network (HTN) planning, and a cognitive walkthrough is not a substitute for eliciting expert cognition.
+
+For credible task errors and recovery, select SHERPA in `35` with an HTA and practitioner evidence. For modeled execution time of practiced, error-free interaction, select GOMS/KLM in `20` with a specified interface and user method. For variability and couplings in everyday sociotechnical work, select FRAM in `06` with work evidence and scenario instantiations. These outputs answer different questions; do not load or compose all three by default.
+
 ### 3. Build a role-aware longlist
 
 Search by problem signal, deliverable, and failure mode—not only by familiar names. Include candidates from distinct roles where warranted:

skills/select-methodologies/references/00-taxonomy-selection.md

@@ -132,6 +132,10 @@ When the same family appears in multiple catalogs, retrieve its generic definiti
 | Product realization and manufacturing readiness | `14-physical-engineering-manufacturing.md` | process scale-up in `15` |
 | Asset management, maintenance, inspection, condition monitoring, spares, and renewal | `34-asset-maintenance-reliability.md` | manufacturing equipment in `14`; built-asset handover in `36` |
 | Human factors, ergonomics, medical devices, and clinical-device evidence | `35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md` | UX in `20`; product realization in `14`; health regulation in `13` |
+| Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA), and expert task/decision elicitation | `35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md` | training objectives/scenarios in `18`; interface/information requirements in `20`; workforce application in `25` |
+| SHERPA: task-based human-error prediction and recovery | `35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md` | broader hazard analysis and assurance in `06`; interaction redesign in `20` |
+| GOMS family and Keystroke-Level Model (KLM): skilled interaction modeling | `20-design-experience-communication.md` | HTA task structure in `35`; measured usability/performance evidence remains distinct |
+| Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM): performance variability and functional couplings | `06-testing-reliability-safety-security.md` | work-as-done evidence in `35`; process interventions in `03` |
 | Construction, infrastructure, BIM, constructability, and commissioning | `36-construction-infrastructure-bim.md` | project controls in `30`; asset operations in `34`; physical engineering in `14` |
 | Urban, territorial, regional, land-use, mobility, public-space, and place-based planning | `38-urban-territorial-planning.md` | geospatial data/models in `33`; construction/BIM in `36`; participation in `24`; climate resilience in `15`/`21`/`32` |
 | LCA, environmental claims, TEA, industrial processes | `15-sustainability-circular-energy.md` | agricultural sustainability in `17` |

skills/select-methodologies/references/06-testing-reliability-safety-security.md

@@ -79,11 +79,35 @@ Use this catalog to choose how confidence will be earned, not merely asserted. S
 | Event Tree Analysis (ETA) | forward consequence analysis | initiating events branch through barrier success/failure to outcomes | state dependencies violate simple branch assumptions |
 | HAZOP | structured deviation analysis | process parameters and guidewords can reveal hazardous deviations | software/control intent lacks meaningful process variables without adaptation |
 | STPA | systems-theoretic hazard analysis | unsafe control actions, inadequate constraints, software/human interaction, and emergent behavior matter | low-risk simple component defect analysis |
+| [Functional Resonance Analysis Method — FRAM](#functional-resonance-analysis-method--fram) | systemic functional analysis; variability and couplings in work-as-done | everyday adaptations and interactions may combine into successful or harmful outcomes | a static diagram is expected to prove causality, predict event probabilities, or satisfy safety assurance by itself |
 | Bow-Tie Analysis | barrier-risk visualization | threats, top event, consequences, preventive and mitigative barriers need one view | quantitative proof or complex feedback dynamics |
 | Safety Integrity Levels / assurance levels | risk-classification/control scheme family | domain standards require rigor proportionate to hazardous failure | invent generic SILs outside the applicable sector standard |
 | Independent V&V | governance/assurance practice | consequences and conflicts of interest justify organizational independence | independence exists only on an org chart without technical authority/evidence access |
 | Safety Case | assurance case for safety | regulator/stakeholders need explicit claims, argument, evidence, context, and defeaters | document created after design solely for approval |
 
+### Functional Resonance Analysis Method — FRAM
+
+- **Type / domain / lifecycle role / stack role:** systemic functional analysis method / sociotechnical systems, safety, and resilience / design exploration, operational learning, and event analysis / explanation and intervention design.
+- **Purpose and output:** understand how ordinary performance variability combines across functions. Produce a bounded function model, evidence-backed variability descriptions, scenario/event instantiations showing relevant couplings, and monitored intervention proposals. The general model describes potential couplings; an instantiation identifies those relevant to a particular situation.
+- **Use when:** everyday adjustments, coordination, resources, and timing may explain successful or harmful outcomes, and practitioners/work evidence can support a functional account beyond a linear failure chain.
+- **Do not use when:** only a simple component failure needs analysis, evidence cannot distinguish modeled assumptions from actual work, or a quantified risk estimate, proven event cause, or compliance claim is expected from a FRAM diagram alone.
+- **Preconditions and required capability:** bounded question/system, access to work-as-done evidence and practitioners, explicit scenario/context, and facilitation able to characterize functions without treating adaptation as operator failure. Proposed future work must be labeled as such.
+- **Typical procedure:**
+  1. Frame the decision and boundary; gather everyday work evidence, including successful operation and adaptations.
+  2. Identify functions needed for activity, starting broadly before refining detail. Describe relevant aspects: Input, Output, Preconditions, Resources, Control, and Time; not every function needs all six filled.
+  3. Trace output couplings to other functions' input, preconditions, resources, control, or time. Account for relevant external sources/receivers with explicit boundary/background functions; justify what is fixed for this analysis.
+  4. Characterize evidence-supported potential variability and context, often including timing and precision. Separate observation from analyst hypothesis.
+  5. Instantiate the model for representative scenarios or a documented event; examine how coupled variability may be amplified or attenuated. Do not infer actual couplings solely from potential ones in the general model.
+  6. Design controls, buffers, monitoring, or resource/coordination changes that preserve necessary adaptation; review with practitioners and evaluate effects under representative conditions.
+- **Complements:** [human-factors work analysis](35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md#human-factors-and-ergonomics) supplies work evidence; process improvement implements interventions; independent hazard analysis and assurance establish additional safety claims.
+- **Alternatives or variants:** STPA analyzes unsafe control actions/constraints; FMEA analyzes failure effects; HTA represents goal/task hierarchy; BPMN represents process flow. These are different outputs. FRAM Model Visualiser is optional tooling; quantitative simulation extensions require their own assumptions and validation.
+- **Failure modes and gaming risks:** rename process boxes as functions without aspects; treat every coupling as observed cause; fill all six aspects mechanically; equate variability with error; invent probabilities; freeze adaptive work indiscriminately; label a model itself as validated risk reduction.
+- **Adoption cost:** medium for bounded qualitative modeling; high for multiple actors/scenarios, evidence collection, and intervention evaluation.
+- **Maturity:** established method; no universal normative edition or assurance certification implied.
+- **Canonical research anchors:** author/community guidance on [building a FRAM model](https://functionalresonance.com/how-to-build-a-fram-model/) and [basic principles](https://functionalresonance.com/basic-principles/).
+- **Current version/status checked on:** 2026-09-12. Official procedure and principles consulted; tool releases are not method editions.
+- **Evidence and unresolved questions:** the four principles concern equivalence of success/failure, approximate adjustments, emergence, and functional resonance. Modeling relies on evidence quality, boundary choices, and analyst judgment; the guidance establishes method structure, not universal causal validity or intervention effectiveness.
+
 ## Reliability engineering
 
 | Candidate | Type and output | Use when | Avoid when |

skills/select-methodologies/references/10-composition-patterns.md

@@ -148,6 +148,22 @@ Use bioremediation only for contaminant treatment. It is not a substitute name f
 
 Satisfaction is not learning, learning is not workplace transfer, and transfer is not causal proof of operational impact.
 
+### Understand work before designing procedures, training, or decision support
+
+`bounded goal + representative work evidence → HTA when goals/operations/plans need structure → CTA on judgment-intensive decisions when expert cues/strategies need elicitation → practitioner review + evidence triangulation → procedure/interface/job aid or training requirements → representative-task evaluation`
+
+Use the canonical [HTA and CTA cards](35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md#task-analysis-canonical-cards-and-selection). Select either method alone when its output is sufficient; their order is a possible composition, not a compulsory pipeline. Without practitioner/work evidence, stop at a provisional model and collection plan. HTA does not establish error probabilities, and CTA testimony does not establish improved outcomes or safety.
+
+### Analyze task errors, skilled interaction, or functional variability
+
+Choose only the output needed; these are separate optional compositions:
+
+- `validated HTA + work evidence → SHERPA credible errors/consequences/recovery → owned design and organizational remedies → representative control/recovery evaluation`. Use the [SHERPA card](35-human-factors-health-medical-devices.md#sherpa); ordinal judgments are not calibrated probabilities.
+- `specified interface + practiced user method → GOMS/KLM operator sequence + sourced durations and assumptions → equivalent-method comparison → user validation of decisive predictions`. Use the [GOMS/KLM card](20-design-experience-communication.md#goms-and-klm); modeled execution time does not establish learning, accessibility, error rates, or achieved savings.
+- `observed everyday work → FRAM function/aspect model → scenario instantiations → evidence-backed variability/coupling analysis → monitored interventions`. Use the [FRAM card](06-testing-reliability-safety-security.md#functional-resonance-analysis-method--fram); potential couplings do not prove actual causes or safety.
+
+If prerequisite evidence is missing, deliver a provisional model and collection plan rather than a definitive risk or performance conclusion.
+
 ### Launch and grow a market offer
 
 `decision + market evidence → STP/ICP/buying committee → positioning + claim–proof → experience/offer/price → GTM + route-to-market → launch-readiness gate → instrumented beachhead → acquisition + activation + retention → experiments/MMM → staged expansion`