From e3a738da28e229094941daf16b10899bdeda38c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Algis Dumbris Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 16:03:03 +0300 Subject: [PATCH] docs(security): drop the server-edition section from the release advisory The server edition has no meaningful install base, so the section was noise for every reader of the notice. Cutting it keeps the advisory focused on what a personal-edition user has to act on, which is the whole reason for pinning a hand-written notice above the generated notes in the first place. The fixes themselves still ship in this release - #1168 and #1169 are merged in #1183 and remain linked from the changelog and their issues, so a server-edition operator can still find them. --- .github/RELEASE_NOTICE.md | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/RELEASE_NOTICE.md b/.github/RELEASE_NOTICE.md index c2cdb0cda..350d536ea 100644 --- a/.github/RELEASE_NOTICE.md +++ b/.github/RELEASE_NOTICE.md @@ -26,20 +26,12 @@ By severity of exposure, and by the log level required: **No non-default configuration was required for the `info` row.** Anyone who has connected an OAuth upstream has authorization codes in `main.log` and in terminal scrollback. Authorization codes are single-use and short-lived, so the durable risk is the authorization-URL line: if an upstream URL carries a static token, that token is in the log of every OAuth-enabled install. -### Server edition - -- **Admin demotion did not take effect** ([#1169](https://github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/issues/1169)) — removing an address from `admin_emails` left the user with full administrator access, including secret reveal, until their session token expired (default 24 hours). Disabling the account did work; demotion alone did not. -- **Agent-token names were a global namespace** ([#1168](https://github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/issues/1168)) — two tenants could not both use the same token name, and the differing responses let any user probe for other users' token names. Agent tokens also carried no tenant identity. -- **A disabled user's agent tokens kept working.** Disabling an account is the documented remediation for a compromised user, and it did not revoke that user's minted tokens. -- **Requested `allowed_servers` was not checked against entitlement**, so a tenant could mint a token scoped to servers they were not entitled to see. - ### What you should do 1. **Rotate your MCPProxy API key.** Remove `api_key` from `~/.mcpproxy/mcp_config.json` and restart to have a new one generated, or set a new value directly. 2. **Revoke and re-mint every agent token** (`mcpproxy token list`, then `mcpproxy token revoke `). Any token issued before this release should be assumed to have had administrator-equivalent reach. 3. **Rotate upstream credentials that appeared in logs.** In order of likelihood: any credential embedded in an upstream server URL; any credential passed as a command-line argument; and, if you ran with Docker isolation at `debug`, upstream environment secrets. 4. **Treat existing log files as secret-bearing.** `~/.mcpproxy/logs/*.log` on Linux, `~/Library/Logs/mcpproxy/*.log` on macOS, `%LOCALAPPDATA%\mcpproxy\logs\*.log` on Windows. Delete them or restrict access; note they may also exist in backups. -5. **Server edition only:** re-check `admin_emails` against who should actually hold admin, and revoke tokens belonging to any disabled account. Redaction preserves diagnostics — flag names, hosts, paths and parameter names still appear in logs, so debugging a connection is unaffected. Only the credential values are masked.