Symptom
squadrant crew send reports delivery failure for messages that were in fact delivered and submitted.
Observed twice on 2026-08-05, same session, same crew (tmpl-contract, opencode):
$ squadrant crew send squadrant tmpl-contract "<multi-line review feedback>"
Message not delivered to crew 'tmpl-contract' — the paste/submit could not be confirmed.
Re-send with 'squadrant crew send squadrant tmpl-contract'.
Both times, reading the crew screen immediately afterward showed the crew actively working the delivered content:
$ squadrant crew read squadrant tmpl-contract
⠋ Thinking: Addressing Specific Issues
I'm focusing on those four key issues. I've got to commit the changes to the
crew/tmpl-contract branch first. Secondly, I'm working on #653 item 4...
The message landed and submitted. Only the confirmation was wrong.
Why this matters
The advice in the failure message is "re-send". Following it would deliver the same instruction twice — for a review-feedback message that means a duplicate work run, and for anything non-idempotent it is worse. The captain has to spot-read the crew screen to find out whether the report was true, which defeats the point of having a confirmation.
A false negative here is more dangerous than no confirmation at all, because it actively recommends a harmful recovery action.
Notes
Suggested direction
Either make the confirmation trustworthy, or — if the signal is inherently unreliable for multi-line pastes — stop recommending a blind re-send and instead direct the operator to verify via squadrant crew read before deciding.
Symptom
squadrant crew sendreports delivery failure for messages that were in fact delivered and submitted.Observed twice on 2026-08-05, same session, same crew (
tmpl-contract, opencode):Both times, reading the crew screen immediately afterward showed the crew actively working the delivered content:
The message landed and submitted. Only the confirmation was wrong.
Why this matters
The advice in the failure message is "re-send". Following it would deliver the same instruction twice — for a review-feedback message that means a duplicate work run, and for anything non-idempotent it is worse. The captain has to spot-read the crew screen to find out whether the report was true, which defeats the point of having a confirmation.
A false negative here is more dangerous than no confirmation at all, because it actively recommends a harmful recovery action.
Notes
Suggested direction
Either make the confirmation trustworthy, or — if the signal is inherently unreliable for multi-line pastes — stop recommending a blind re-send and instead direct the operator to verify via
squadrant crew readbefore deciding.