Monolithic self-update version check + TC3xx/wolfHSM changes

.gitignore

@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ tools/unit-tests/unit-policy-create
 tools/unit-tests/unit-sign-encrypted-output
 tools/unit-tests/unit-update-flash-delta
 tools/unit-tests/unit-update-flash-self-update
+tools/unit-tests/unit-update-flash-self-update-monolithic
 tools/unit-tests/unit-update-flash-hook
 tools/unit-tests/unit-loader-tpm-init
 tools/unit-tests/unit-update-ram-nofixed

docs/compile.md

@@ -827,6 +827,7 @@ make CERT_CHAIN_VERIFY=1 \
 
 - `USER_CERT_CHAIN` requires both `USER_PRIVATE_KEY` and `USER_PUBLIC_KEY`
 - The private and public keys must correspond to the leaf certificate identity in the chain
+- If the chain uses X.509 name constraints and you are building as a wolfHSM server (`WOLFHSM_SERVER=1`), set `CERT_CHAIN_NAME_CONSTRAINTS=1`.
 
 When `CERT_CHAIN_VERIFY=1` is set without `USER_CERT_CHAIN`, the build auto-generates a dummy 3-tier certificate hierarchy in `test-dummy-ca/` for testing. This also applies to wolfHSM NVM image generation when applicable.
 

docs/firmware_update.md

@@ -257,6 +257,15 @@ bytes and the nested application image. Later calls to
 `fw_size` bytes starting at `ARCH_FLASH_OFFSET`, spanning into the BOOT
 partition.
 
+The persisted header also sets the version a new payload must exceed. A
+staged payload is installed only if its version is greater than both the
+running bootloader's `WOLFBOOT_VERSION` and the version in the
+self-header. The bootloader inside each payload can therefore keep the
+same `WOLFBOOT_VERSION` across releases. Without the self-header only
+`WOLFBOOT_VERSION` is checked, so the bootloader in each payload must be
+built with `WOLFBOOT_VERSION` equal to the payload's signed version,
+otherwise the update is rejected.
+
 ##### Restrictions
 
 - **Not power-fail safe.** Like all self-updates, a monolithic update

docs/wolfHSM.md

@@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ This section describes the exposed configuration options available for wolfHSM i
 - `WOLFHSM_CFG_COMM_DATA_LEN` (default 5000): Size in bytes of the wolfHSM message data payload. The default fits a whole DER certificate chain or the largest ML-DSA keys/signatures in a single message. Targets with a smaller transport slot must lower it in their `.config`. In server mode the value is currently only applied to `SIGN=ML_DSA` builds; other server builds use the wolfHSM library default.
 - `WOLFHSM_CFG_CERT_MAX_VERIFY_ROOTS` (default 8): Maximum number of trusted root CA NVM IDs accepted for certificate chain verification; bounds the length of the HAL `hsmNvmIdCertRootCAList` and of `WOLFHSM_NVM_ROOT_CA_LIST`. Part of the client-server wire format (see note below).
 - `WOLFHSM_NVM_ROOT_CA_LIST`: Overrides the NVM IDs of the trusted root CA certificates used for certificate chain verification. Takes a comma-separated initializer with no quotes and no spaces, e.g. `WOLFHSM_NVM_ROOT_CA_LIST=1,2,3`. Client mode takes the client's cert IDs (e.g. `1`); server mode takes full NVM IDs (e.g. `0x6101`). The list length must not exceed `WOLFHSM_CFG_CERT_MAX_VERIFY_ROOTS`. Only used when `CERT_CHAIN_VERIFY=1`.
+- `CERT_CHAIN_NAME_CONSTRAINTS` (default 0): Set to 1 to enforce X.509 name constraints during certificate chain verification. When 0, name constraint support is compiled out of wolfSSL (`IGNORE_NAME_CONSTRAINTS`), so a chain containing a certificate with a critical name constraints extension will be rejected whereas a non-critical one will be ignored. Only applies when wolfBoot is configured as a wolfHSM server.
 - `WOLFHSM_NVM_IMAGE` (default 1): Set to 0 to skip wolfHSM NVM image generation. Used by targets that do not provision keys from a pre-built NVM image, e.g. because the HAL loads the verification key into the server's key cache at boot (PIC32CZ).
 - `USER_NVM_INIT`: Path to a user-provided whnvmtool `.nvminit` file used to generate the wolfHSM NVM image in place of the default auto-generated one. Also re-enables NVM image generation when user-provided keys (`USER_PRIVATE_KEY`, `USER_PUBLIC_KEY`, `USER_CERT_CHAIN`) would otherwise skip it.
 

hal/aurix_tc3xx.c

@@ -91,7 +91,9 @@
 /* wolfHSM client context and configuration */
 #if defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_CLIENT)
 
-static int _connectCb(void* context, whCommConnected connect);
+/* wolfHSM TC3xx port client, which selects the comm buffer and the bridge
+ * flags. wolfBoot and then the application on CPU0 both use client 0. */
+#define HSM_CLIENT 0
 
 /* Client configuration/contexts */
 static whTransportMemClientContext tmcCtx[1] = {0};
@@ -172,8 +174,8 @@ void wolfBoot_panic(void) TC3_LONGCALL;
  * to force the HSM core to execute from RAM while the host-driven flash
  * command completes.
  * The server app must be running first to process a park request */
-#define HSM_PARK() (void)tchsmHhHost_HsmPark()
-#define HSM_RELEASE() (void)tchsmHhHost_HsmRelease()
+#define HSM_PARK() (void)tchsmHhHost_HsmPark(HSM_CLIENT)
+#define HSM_RELEASE() (void)tchsmHhHost_HsmRelease(HSM_CLIENT)
 #else
 #define HSM_PARK()
 #define HSM_RELEASE()
@@ -587,63 +589,33 @@ RAMFUNCTION void ext_flash_unlock(void)
 
 #ifdef WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_CLIENT
 
-static int _connectCb(void* context, whCommConnected connect)
-{
-    int ret;
-
-    switch (connect) {
-        case WH_COMM_CONNECTED:
-            ret = tchsmHhHost2Hsm_Notify(TCHSM_HOST2HSM_NOTIFY_CONNECT);
-            break;
-        case WH_COMM_DISCONNECTED:
-            ret = tchsmHhHost2Hsm_Notify(TCHSM_HOST2HSM_NOTIFY_DISCONNECT);
-            break;
-        default:
-            ret = WH_ERROR_BADARGS;
-            break;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
 int hal_hsm_init_connect(void)
 {
-    int    rc = 0;
-    size_t i;
-
-    /* init shared memory buffers */
-    uint32_t* req = (uint32_t*)hsmShmCore0CommBuf;
-    uint32_t* resp =
-        (uint32_t*)hsmShmCore0CommBuf + HSM_SHM_CORE0_COMM_BUF_WORDS / 2;
-    whTransportMemConfig tmcCfg[1] = {{
-        .req       = req,
-        .req_size  = HSM_SHM_CORE0_COMM_BUF_SIZE / 2,
-        .resp      = resp,
-        .resp_size = HSM_SHM_CORE0_COMM_BUF_SIZE / 2,
-    }};
+    int rc = 0;
 
+    whTransportMemConfig tmcCfg[1] = {{0}};
 
     /* Client configuration/contexts */
     whCommClientConfig cc_conf[1] = {{
         .transport_cb      = tmcCb,
         .transport_context = (void*)tmcCtx,
         .transport_config  = (void*)tmcCfg,
         .client_id         = WOLFBOOT_WOLFHSM_CLIENT_ID,
-        .connect_cb        = _connectCb,
+        .connect_cb        = hsm_ipc_get_connect_cb(HSM_CLIENT),
     }};
 
     whClientConfig c_conf[1] = {{
         .comm     = cc_conf,
     }};
 
-    rc = hsm_ipc_init();
+    rc = hsm_ipc_init(HSM_CLIENT);
     if (rc != WH_ERROR_OK) {
         return rc;
     }
 
-    /* init shared memory buffers */
-    for (i = 0; i < HSM_SHM_CORE0_COMM_BUF_WORDS; i++) {
-        hsmShmCore0CommBuf[i] = 0;
+    rc = hsm_ipc_transport_config(HSM_CLIENT, tmcCfg);
+    if (rc != WH_ERROR_OK) {
+        return rc;
     }
 
     rc = wh_Client_Init(&hsmClientCtx, c_conf);

include/user_settings.h

@@ -344,7 +344,10 @@ extern int tolower(int c);
 #       define WOLFSSL_SP_SMALL
 #   endif
 #       define WOLFSSL_HAVE_SP_ECC
-#       define WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN
+#       if !defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_CLIENT) && \
+           !defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_SERVER)
+#           define WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN
+#       endif
 #       define HAVE_ECC_KEY_EXPORT
 #       define HAVE_ECC_KEY_IMPORT
 #   endif
@@ -423,8 +426,7 @@ extern int tolower(int c);
      * guard keeps it from satisfying the inner condition there. */
 #   ifndef WC_NO_RNG
 #       if defined(WOLFCRYPT_SECURE_MODE) || defined(WOLFBOOT_TPM_PARMENC) || \
-           defined(WOLFCRYPT_TEST) || defined(WOLFCRYPT_BENCHMARK) || \
-           defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_SERVER)
+           defined(WOLFCRYPT_TEST) || defined(WOLFCRYPT_BENCHMARK)
 #           define WC_RSA_BLINDING
 #       endif
 #   endif
@@ -438,8 +440,7 @@ extern int tolower(int c);
 #   endif
 #   if !defined(WOLFBOOT_TPM) && !defined(WOLFCRYPT_SECURE_MODE) && \
        !defined(WOLFCRYPT_TEST) && !defined(WOLFCRYPT_BENCHMARK) && \
-       !defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_CLIENT) && \
-       !defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_SERVER)
+       !defined(WOLFBOOT_ENABLE_WOLFHSM_CLIENT)
 #       define WOLFSSL_RSA_VERIFY_INLINE
 #       define WOLFSSL_RSA_VERIFY_ONLY
 #       define WOLFSSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ONLY
@@ -1029,7 +1030,10 @@ extern int tolower(int c);
 #   define WOLF_CRYPTO_CB
 #   undef  HAVE_ANONYMOUS_INLINE_AGGREGATES
 #   define HAVE_ANONYMOUS_INLINE_AGGREGATES 1
-#   define WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN
+    /* wolfBoot's own client and server never generate keys */
+#   ifdef WOLFCRYPT_TZ_WOLFHSM
+#       define WOLFSSL_KEY_GEN
+#   endif
 #endif
 
 /* Secure-side sizing common to any wolfHSM server build (TZ engine and
@@ -1104,6 +1108,9 @@ extern int tolower(int c);
 #   define WOLFSSL_USER_IO
 #   define WOLFSSL_SP_MUL_D
 #   define WOLFSSL_ALLOW_NO_SUITES
+#   ifndef WOLFBOOT_CERT_CHAIN_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
+#       define IGNORE_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
+#   endif
 #endif
 
 #ifdef WOLFSSL_STM32_PKA

options.mk

@@ -1992,6 +1992,11 @@ ifneq ($(CERT_CHAIN_VERIFY),)
     CFLAGS += '-DWOLFBOOT_WOLFHSM_NVM_ROOT_CA_LIST=$(WOLFHSM_NVM_ROOT_CA_LIST)'
   endif
 
+  # Optional: enforce X.509 name constraints. Off by default for code size.
+  ifeq ($(CERT_CHAIN_NAME_CONSTRAINTS),1)
+    CFLAGS += -DWOLFBOOT_CERT_CHAIN_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
+  endif
+
   # User-provided cert chain takes precedence. Declare the chain's
   # algorithms via AUX_PK_ALGOS/AUX_HASH_ALGOS so the verifier has them.
   ifneq ($(USER_CERT_CHAIN),)

src/update_flash.c

@@ -287,7 +287,17 @@ void RAMFUNCTION wolfBoot_check_self_update(void)
             (wolfBoot_open_image(&update, PART_UPDATE) == 0) &&
             wolfBoot_get_image_type(PART_UPDATE) == (HDR_IMG_TYPE_WOLFBOOT | HDR_IMG_TYPE_AUTH)) {
         uint32_t update_version = wolfBoot_update_firmware_version();
-        if (update_version <= wolfboot_version) {
+        uint32_t current_version = wolfboot_version;
+#if defined(WOLFBOOT_SELF_UPDATE_MONOLITHIC) && defined(WOLFBOOT_SELF_HEADER)
+        /* The self-header has the installed payload's version, which may be
+         * newer than the WOLFBOOT_VERSION this bootloader was built with */
+        uint32_t self_version = wolfBoot_get_self_version();
+
+        if (self_version > current_version) {
+            current_version = self_version;
+        }
+#endif
+        if (update_version <= current_version) {
             wolfBoot_erase_partition(PART_UPDATE);
             return;
         }

test-app/app_aurix_tc3xx.c

@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ static void hsmUpdate(void)
     if (wolfBoot_current_firmware_version() > BASE_FW_VERSION) {
         return;
     }
-    rc = tchsmHhHost_HsmUpdateTrigger();
+    /* Client 0 is the wolfHSM client of this core */
+    rc = tchsmHhHost_HsmUpdateTrigger(0);
     if (rc == 0) {
         wolfBoot_printf("HSM update triggered\n");
     }

tools/config.mk

@@ -166,4 +166,5 @@ CONFIG_VARS:= ARCH TARGET SIGN HASH MCUXSDK MCUXPRESSO MCUXPRESSO_CPU MCUXPRESSO
 	AUX_HASH_ALGOS \
 	CERT_CHAIN_GEN_CA_ALGO \
 	CERT_CHAIN_GEN_CA_HASH \
+	CERT_CHAIN_NAME_CONSTRAINTS \
 	ENCRYPT_CACHE

tools/test.mk

@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ test-sim-self-update-monolithic: wolfboot.bin test-app/image_v1_signed.bin FORCE
 # Same as test-sim-self-update-monolithic, but also verifies that the
 # self-header was persisted at WOLFBOOT_PARTITION_SELF_HEADER_ADDRESS and
 # matches the signing tool's --header-only output byte-for-byte.
+# A second boot checks that the payload is not installed again.
 #
 test-sim-self-update-monolithic-self-header: wolfboot.bin test-app/image_v1_signed.bin FORCE
 	@echo "=== Simulator Monolithic Self-Update + Self-Header Test ==="
@@ -341,6 +342,11 @@ test-sim-self-update-monolithic-self-header: wolfboot.bin test-app/image_v1_sign
 	$(Q)dd if=internal_flash.dd bs=1 skip=$$(($(WOLFBOOT_PARTITION_SELF_HEADER_ADDRESS) - $(ARCH_FLASH_OFFSET))) count=$$(($(WOLFBOOT_SECTOR_SIZE))) of=persisted_hdr.dd 2>/dev/null
 	$(Q)cmp -n $$(($(IMAGE_HEADER_SIZE))) persisted_hdr.dd monolithic_payload_v2_header.bin
 	@echo "  Self-header persisted correctly: PASSED"
+	@# Boot again. The self-header shows the payload is already installed, so
+	@# wolfBoot should erase it from the update partition, not install it again.
+	$(Q)./wolfboot.elf get_version || true
+	$(Q)dd if=internal_flash.dd bs=1 skip=$$(($(WOLFBOOT_PARTITION_UPDATE_ADDRESS) - $(ARCH_FLASH_OFFSET))) count=4 2>/dev/null | od -An -tx1 | grep -q "ff ff ff ff"
+	@echo "  Installed payload erased from UPDATE on next boot: PASSED"
 	@echo "=== Monolithic Self-Update + Self-Header Test PASSED ==="
 
 # Test that an oversized monolithic self-update is rejected. The payload is

tools/unit-tests/Makefile

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ TESTS:=unit-parser unit-parser-large-header unit-fdt unit-extflash unit-string \
        unit-update-flash-hook \
        unit-update-flash-self-update \
        unit-update-flash-self-update-ecc \
+       unit-update-flash-self-update-monolithic \
        unit-nsc-update \
        unit-update-flash-enc unit-update-flash-enc-full unit-update-flash-enc-intswap unit-update-ram unit-update-ram-fit unit-update-ram-uboot unit-update-ram-enc unit-update-ram-enc-nopart unit-update-ram-nofixed unit-update-ram-nofixed-noramboot unit-update-ram-noramboot unit-update-ram-custom-trailer unit-custom-trailer-nopart unit-update-flash-hwswap unit-pkcs11_store unit-psa_store unit-wolfhsm_flash_hal unit-disk \
        unit-update-disk unit-update-disk-confirm unit-update-disk-golden unit-update-disk-fsp unit-update-disk-oob unit-update-disk-fit unit-update-disk-fit-ramdisk unit-multiboot unit-boot-x86-fsp unit-loader-tpm-init unit-qspi-flash unit-fwtpm-stub unit-tpm-rsa-exp \
@@ -408,6 +409,17 @@ unit-update-flash-self-update-ecc:CFLAGS+=-DMOCK_PARTITIONS -DWOLFBOOT_NO_SIGN -
 	-DNVM_FLASH_JOURNAL -DNVM_FLASH_ECC -DWOLFBOOT_FLASH_WRITE_UNIT=32 \
 	-DWOLFBOOT_SECTOR_SIZE=0x1000 -DWOLFBOOT_SELF_HEADER \
 	-DWOLFBOOT_PARTITION_SELF_HEADER_ADDRESS=0xCD004000
+# Same as unit-update-flash-self-update, plus monolithic mode and a self-header
+# (in the unused SWAP sector), to check that an update is only installed if it
+# is newer than the version in the self-header. Some addresses are plain
+# numbers because image.c is built separately and cannot see MOCK_ADDRESS_*.
+unit-update-flash-self-update-monolithic:CFLAGS+=-DMOCK_PARTITIONS -DWOLFBOOT_NO_SIGN -DUNIT_TEST_AUTH \
+	-DWOLFBOOT_HASH_SHA256 -DPRINTF_ENABLED -DEXT_FLASH -DPART_UPDATE_EXT -DPART_SWAP_EXT \
+	-DRAM_CODE -DARCH_SIM -DUNIT_TEST_SELF_UPDATE_ONLY -DWOLFBOOT_SELF_UPDATE_MONOLITHIC \
+	-DWOLFBOOT_SELF_HEADER -DWOLFBOOT_SELF_HEADER_EXT \
+	-DWOLFBOOT_PARTITION_SELF_HEADER_ADDRESS=0xCE000000 \
+	-DARCH_FLASH_OFFSET=0xCD000000 -DWOLFBOOT_VERSION=7 \
+	-DWOLFBOOT_ORIGIN=MOCK_ADDRESS_BOOT -DBOOTLOADER_PARTITION_SIZE=WOLFBOOT_PARTITION_SIZE
 unit-update-ram-fit:CFLAGS+=-DMOCK_PARTITIONS -DWOLFBOOT_NO_SIGN -DUNIT_TEST_AUTH \
 	-DWOLFBOOT_HASH_SHA256 -DPRINTF_ENABLED -DEXT_FLASH -DPART_UPDATE_EXT \
 	-DPART_SWAP_EXT -DPART_BOOT_EXT -DWOLFBOOT_DUALBOOT -DNO_XIP \
@@ -872,6 +884,11 @@ unit-update-flash-self-update-ecc: ../../include/target.h unit-update-flash.c
 	$(WOLFBOOT_LIB_WOLFSSL)/wolfcrypt/src/sha256.c \
 	$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
 
+unit-update-flash-self-update-monolithic: ../../include/target.h unit-update-flash.c
+	gcc -o $@ unit-update-flash.c ../../src/image.c \
+	$(WOLFBOOT_LIB_WOLFSSL)/wolfcrypt/src/sha256.c \
+	$(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
 unit-sdhci-response-bits: ../../include/target.h unit-sdhci-response-bits.c
 	gcc -o $@ $^ $(CFLAGS) -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections $(LDFLAGS) \
 		-Wl,--gc-sections